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Abstract
We explore how tax contracts affect government formation and welfare of voters
in a democracy with proportional elections, four parties and sincere voting. A tax
contract specifies a range of tax rates a party is committed to if in government.
We develop a new model of party competition and formation of the government
which chooses tax rates, public-good provision, and perks. We show that the
introduction of tax contracts has two effects: a perks effect and a policy-shift
effect. The former plays a central role in societies with a low degree of political
polarization, where it tends to reduce politicians’ perks. In highly polarized
societies, tax contracts can yield more moderate political outcomes. However,
there exist circumstances in which tax contracts induce more extreme policies.
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“Read my lips: no new taxes.”
George H. W. Bush, Republican National Convention on Aug. 18, 1988, New Orleans, LA.
1 Introduction
We start from the observation that many campaign promises are reneged. One of the
most popular examples is the promise by the former President of the United States of
America, George H. W. Bush, to not raise taxes. A more recent example occured in
the general election in Germany in 2005. The Social Democrats (SPD) promised not
to raise the value-added tax rate, whereas the Conservatives (CDU/CSU) announced a
two percentage points increase. The election outcome forced the two large parties into
a grand coalition which finally implemented an increase of the value-added tax rate of
three percent. So both large parties reneged on their campaign promises.
These and many more incidents where campaign promises have been violated raise the
question whether politicians or parties should be allowed to sign political contracts
that make their campaign promises binding. In this paper, we study how political
contracts affect government formation and the welfare of voters in democracies with
proportional elections. A political contract is a written promise made by a politician
or a party, coupled with sanctions and bonuses depending on whether the promises
are kept when they are in office. For instance, the office-holder may lose his right to
stand for reelection if he fails to fulfill the promises in the political contract, or he may
receive extra rewards if he honors the contract.
Campaign promises, however, can only qualify as political contracts if a public certi-
fication body approves them. This, in turn, requires that hard and non-manipulable
information is available when the contract is up for review. It is clear that only a sub-
set of political decisions are certifiable and are thus viable candidates for inclusion in
political contracts. In particular, financial promises are easier to certify than promises
regarding the level of public goods. For instance, the promise not to raise taxes is
certifiable, whereas promises to increase the strength and the morale of the military or
to improve the quality of the judical system or the health-care system are not.
In this paper, we examine this partial certification problem in a setting where political
parties can make binding promises regarding the financing of public goods in the form
of tax contracts, but no binding promises regarding the amount of public goods they
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will provide once in office. A tax contract specifies a range of tax rates a party is
committed to if it is part of the government.
To study the impact of tax contracts, we develop a new type of model of party com-
petition in a democracy with proportional elections, where three conventional parties,
one large party politically to the left and another large party politically to the right
of a smaller center party, compete for office. Conventional parties choose a tax rate, a
level of public good provision and perks when in office. The preferred level of taxes of
the left party is higher than that of the center party which in turn exceeds the right
party’s preferred tax rate. A fourth and extremist party whose ideological focus is
on an extreme policy change in a fourth dimension such as closing borders to foreign-
ers, enters parliament with a certain probability and may force the large conventional
parties to enter into a grand coalition. The set-up with two larger parties and one
smaller conventional party, together with a fourth more extreme party is motivated
by the political landscapes in parliamentary democracies in Europe. For instance, in
Germany the two large parties might be interpreted as the Social Democrats and the
Christian Democrats while the center party might represent the smaller liberal party.
In the general election in 2005, the Social Democrats ruled out to form a coalition that
would include the party ”Die Linke” and formed a grand coalition with the Christian
Democrats. Moreover, the feature that an extremist party forces grand coalitions is a
common attribute of democracies with proportional representation. Recent examples
include elections in Germany, 2005, Austria, 2008, 2006, 1995, 1990, 1986, Turkey,
1999, and Hungary, 1994.1
We first examine the model where no tax contracts are allowed. We show that if the
extremist party does not enter, a small coalition of conventional parties will form. In
our model, the essential characteristic of the bargaining process between two potential
coalition partners is that they maximize their joint utility weighted by their relative
seat shares in government. Hence, the chosen policy is a convex combination of the
coalition partners’ political orientation and will either be to the left or to the right of
the center. If the extreme party does enter, a grand coalition is formed that implements
more moderate policies. In both cases, tax rates are higher than desired by voters, since
parties use some of the tax revenues to fund their perks.
Second, we examine how this democracy performs when parties can sign political con-
tracts regarding taxes during the campaign, i.e. parties can commit to the set of tax
1Source: Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (2008).
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rates they are allowed to choose from, if they are part of the government. The parties,
however, cannot commit to a particular amount of public-good provision or to the level
of perks, since such promises are not certifiable.2
Tax contracts have the following effects: (a) a policy-shift effect, as tax contracts may
allow a party to influence the policy of the coalition government in favor of its own
ideal point. Intuitively, when specifying their tax contracts the large parties face the
trade-off between (i) including the center party’s preferred tax rate into the contract
to be able to form a small coalition with the center party if the extreme party does not
enter parliament and (ii) forgoing the possibility to form a small coalition by restricting
tax rates around its own ideal point to obtain a more favorable outcome in a grand
coalition when the extreme party enters parliament.
Consequently, we find two types of equilibria: one where all parties’ tax sets specified
in their contracts intersect at the center of the political spectrum and another where
one of the large parties restricts its tax set around its ideal point only intersecting
the contracted set of tax rates of the other large party, but not that of the center
party. The first type of equilibrium with tax contracts occurs when the probability
of the extreme party entering parliament is low. In this case, tax contracts induce
a policy shift towards the center of the political spectrum. The second equilibrium
type with tax contracts occurs when the probability of the extreme party possessing
parliamentary weight is sufficiently large. While in this equilibrium small coalitions
still yield moderate policies, the policy outcome of large coalitions will be more to the
left or right of the political spectrum than the policies occuring when no tax contracts
are available. Here, the policy shift effect can lead to less moderate policies.
Additionally, tax contracts involve (b) a perks effect that can lead to lower tax rates.
When bargaining over the policy of the coalition government, both parties receive
perks proportional to their relative seat share in government and the amount of public
good that will be provided. When choosing a tax contract, the parties in the coalition
government perceive the perks of their coalition partner as a negative externality to
public-good provision. This gives incentives to restrict the bargaining outcome to lower
public good provision and tax rates.
We find that tax contracts may involve substantial welfare gains in highly polarized
societies when the policy-shift effect tends toward the center, as this keeps policies
2There are instances where the amount of public goods is certifiable, e.g. if the public good is the
building of a bridge. However, even in these cases the specific construction is not certifiable.
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moderate. However, when the policy shift with tax contracts will be towards the
left or right, tax contracts yield more extreme outcomes and may not be welfare-
improving. The perks effect plays an important role in societies with a low degree of
polarization. However, it will depend on the concrete parameter values whether this
leads to considerable welfare improvements. Our numerical examples suggest rather
moderate relative welfare differences from the perks effect. The relative welfare impacts
of the policy-shift effect seem to be substantially higher.
We suggest that tax contracts would probably have made a difference in the general
election in Germany in 2005. As indicated above, before the election the CDU/CSU
announced a two-percentage-point increase, while the SPD pledged not to increase
the tax rate at all. The election outcome forced both parties into a grand coalition,
since the extreme party “Die Linke” entered parliament and no party wanted to form
a coalition with them. The grand coalition increased the value-added tax by three
percentage points. Had tax contracts been feasible, tax rates would either have been
lower after the government was formed or parties would have made different binding
promises regarding the tax rate.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we relate our analysis to the literature.
The model is developed in section 3. In section 4 the formation of coalition governments
without contracts is examined. We introduce tax contracts into the legislative game
in section 5 and characterize the equilibria with tax contracts. In section 6 the perks
effect and the policy-shift effect are identified. Thereafter, in section 7, we compare
the different regimes with respect to a utilitarian welfare function. We illustrate our
results with some numerical examples in section 8. Section 9 concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
Our paper is related to five strands of the literature. First, some recent literature
suggests that political contracts might be a viable supplement to democracies (e.g.
Gersbach (2005)). This literature assumes that the output of policy actions is certifiable
or can be made certifiable. In this paper, we examine the democratic provision of public
goods when financing is certifiable while output is not. We consider tax contracts
constraining the set of tax rates a party can choose from if it is part of the government.
For an analysis of tax contracts in a democracy with three parties and strategic voting
we refer to our companion paper (Gersbach and Schneider, forthcoming).
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Second, we explore the impact of a commitment device for taxes when parties negotiate
a government policy set consisting of taxes, public goods and perks. The literature on
bilateral bargaining has devoted considerable attention to the role of commitment. As
first pointed out by Schelling (1960), the possibility of establishing commitment benefits
the committed party. Muthoo (1992, 1996) provided comprehensive analytical support
for the viewpoint that higher irrevocability of a commitment improves the payoff for
the committed player. When players can choose commitment in the bargaining pro-
cess with a deadline, Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) show that commitment causes
inefficient delay until the deadline is reached. Cunyat (2004) explains the consequences
when players can choose the degree of irrevocability of commitment. He shows that
a player chooses an intermediate degree of irrevocability when the costs of increasing
the degree of commitment are small enough. We examine a bargaining problem in the
political area in which parties can make a commitment in one dimension (taxes) while
the level of public goods and perks are determined at the actual bargaining stage.
Third, in order to account for uncertain coalition formation, we introduce a new type
of model of party competition where three conventional parties and an extremist party
compete for office. As the policy that separates the conventional parties from the
extremist party is indivisible, only conventional parties will form a coalition. The
formation process builds on the theory of governmental coalition formation. We refer
to Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee (2006) and Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) for
surveys. Our approach in specifying coalition formation involving a formateur follows
in particular Roemer (2001).
Fourth, we suggest a new type of tax competition that may deliver welfare improve-
ments. The standard theme since Tiebout (1956) has been that local or national
jurisdictions compete on taxes and public inputs for mobile factors. In particular, a
large body of literature on international tax competition suggests that mobility of cap-
ital restricts national tax autonomy and puts pressure on governments to reduce taxes
on mobile factors and to improve the efficiency of public-good provision.3 We develop a
new form of tax competition by parties that has the potential to increase the efficiency
of the combination of tax and public spending. Moreover, there is an extensive range
of literature on how democratic institutions affect rent extraction by political agents.
A general theme in this literature is that, in a representative democracy, office-holders
3See Wilson (1999) for a survey and Benassy-Quer et al. (2007) for a recent assessment of whether
a “race to the bottom” regarding corporate tax rates is taking place in Europe.
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can extract rents and that referendums will reduce the representative’s opportunities
for rent extraction (see e.g. Feld et al. (2008)). We suggest a new type of institution
that can help to limit rent extraction by agents in a representative democracy.
Fifth, we focus on proportional electoral systems. In these widespread systems, a
multitude of parties are usually present in parliament and governments are formed
by coalitions. A common theme in the literature on proportional election systems
is how such coalitions affect spending and public goods allocation in comparison to
majoritarian systems (Persson and Tabellini (2003), Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)). In
this paper, we examine how tax contracts affect policies and perks in proportional
electoral systems.
3 The Model
3.1 Voters and policies
We consider a society consisting of a set of voters, I, who differ in their income levels
yi, i ∈ I. Without loss of generality we assume I = [0, 1]. Income is distributed over
the interval [ymin, ymax] according to density f(y). Aggregate income Y is given by
Y =
∫ ymax
ymin
yf(y)dy = y¯,
where y¯ denotes the average income. The government is organized as a parliamentary
democracy where a majority coalition in the legislature elects the ministers of the
executive branch. The total number of seats in the parliament is given by Sp and there
are S (S even) seats in government (e.g. S ministers). The government decides on
• the level of a public good g ∈ R+ and the perks b ∈ R+ for the parties in power;
both are financed by an income tax with associated tax distortion λ; There are no
fixed costs of public good provision and we normalize the unit cost of providing
the public good to one.
• a binary policy d ∈ {0, d¯}, where d = 0 represents the status quo and d = d¯
represents an indivisible policy change, such as waging a war or stopping immi-
gration.
The utility of a voter with income yi is
Ui = U(yi, δi) = A ln g − tyi − δid,
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where δi ∈ {−1, 1}. The variable t denotes the tax rate on income and A is a positive
constant.
The desired policy of a voter characterized by (yi, δi = 1) is the solution of the following
problem:
max
t,g,d≥0
Ui
s.t. tY = (1 + λ)g.
It is obvious that the optimal choice is d∗i = 0. Substituting t in Ui, the first-order
condition with respect to g is
A
g
− yi (1 + λ)
Y
= 0,
which yields
t∗i =
A
yi
, (1)
g∗i =
Y A
yi(1 + λ)
. (2)
We complete the description by d∗i = 0. The solution for a voter characterized by
(yi, δi = −1) is identical, except that d∗i = d¯. In the following, several other tax rates
become important next to the most preferred tax rate of voter i, t∗i . For the reader’s
convenience, we provide the notation and meaning of all the different tax rates in
Appendix B.
3.2 Parties
There are three conventional parties denoted by j, k ∈ {L,M,R} competing for seats
in the parliament. We reflect the parties’ political orientation by (yj, δj), which we
also refer to as the parties’ platforms. That is, (yL, 1), (yM , 1), and (yR, 1) are the plat-
forms of parties L, M, and R, respectively. The parties’ platforms can be interpreted as
reflecting the characteristics of their median member. Consequently, the preferred poli-
cies of the parties especially favor voters with characteristics close to their platforms.
We refer to parties as ‘conventional’ if their platform involves δ = 1. We assume that
yL < yM < yR. M is the middle party, while L (R) is left (right) of the center. Parties
are interested in the policies the government enacts and in the perks from holding
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office. Both these motives for politicians are well-documented in the literature.4 In
particular, the utility of a party is assumed to be given by5
Vk = U(yk, 1) + 2θsk
√
b, (3)
where θ is a weighting factor and b are the perks in office per member of party k if
party k is part of the government. The variable sk denotes the number of party k’ s
governmental seats. If party k were the sole party in power, i.e. if sk = S, the party’s
policy would result from the following utility-maximization problem:
max
t,g,b,d
Vk
s.t. tY = (1 + λ)(g + skb)
Accordingly, party k would choose
t∗k =
A
yk
+
θ2Y sk
y2k(1 + λ)
, (4)
g∗k =
Y A
yk(1 + λ)
, (5)
b∗k =
θ2Y 2
y2k(1 + λ)
2
, (6)
d∗k = 0. (7)
The parties’ optimal policy with regard to the public good corresponds to the preferred
policy of the respective platform voter. The tax rate, however, is higher than voter
yk’s preferred tax rate, since the party finances perks for its members in government.
Finally, there is a protest or extreme party E with platform (yE,−1) and utility
VE = U(yE ,−1) + 2θsE
√
b.
4See e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2003), Gersbach (2005), Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee (2006).
5The rationale for this utility function is as follows. First, utility functions of voters are quasi-
linear (e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2003)). Second, the utility derived from the public good exhibits
diminishing returns and assumes with its logarithmic specification that a certain minimum amount
of the public good is essential. A minimal provision of public goods, such as security, transportation
infrastructure and property rights, is viewed as essential for the functioning of the economy and the
state. Concerning the parties’ preferences, suppose party k consists of Sk members with political
preferences U(yk, 1) and sk members additionally enjoy utility 2θ˜sk
√
b from perks when the party is
part of the government. Then aggregate utility for party k is given by SkU(yk, 1)+ 2θ˜sk
√
b. Dividing
by Sk and defining θ = θ˜/Sk yields Vk as in equation (3). Perks capture ego rents, certain privileges
and rents from office holding, pork barrel projects and the like. There are diminishing returns to
perks, but unlike with public-good provision, a minimum amount is not essential. These two features
are reflected by using the square root of the amount of perks in the utility functions of the parties.
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The extreme party would like to implement d¯. If the extreme party could form a
government, it would choose d¯ and t∗E(yE), g
∗
E(yE), b
∗
E(yE). The latter correspond to
equations (4)-(6) evaluated at income level yE . We assume that policy d is important
to voters in the sense that a voter with δi = −1 is better off with the optimal choice of
party E than with any choice of the conventional parties, independently of the income
level. In turn, voters with δi = 1 are better off with any of the optimal choices of the
conventional parties than with the optimal choice of E.
3.3 The legislative game
We allow parties to commit to tax contracts, i.e. a party can voluntarily restrict its
tax policy to an arbitrary range of tax rates. We assume that there is an independent
institution that enforces the contracts. If the party violates the contract, the institution
imposes penalties that are sufficiently large to ensure that violation never occurs.6
Penalties may take the form of reduction or elimination of party financing, or even
exclusion from government. We consider the following game structure:
Stage 1: Contract choice
Stage 2: Election
Stage 3: Government formation
With respect to the contract choice stage, our analysis proceeds in two steps. First,
as a benchmark, we examine the standard case where parties cannot sign contracts,
i.e. in which stage 1 is omitted. Second, we allow parties to sign tax contracts.
At the election stage, we assume that voters vote sincerely, i.e. they vote for the
party whose policy would yield the highest utility if it were the sole party in power.
That is, a voter supports the party whose representative voter is closest to him.7
Finally, at the third stage a government forms. It is assumed that only conventional
parties can form a government, i.e. party E is excluded from the government formation
6In the event of catastrophe or crisis, contracts may be renegotiated or canceled, if a supermajority
(two-thirds majority or three-quarters majority) of parliamentary members vote for such a proposal.
7For a recent empirical justification of the sincere voting assumption in elections, see Degan and
Merlo (2007). It has been argued that sincere voting may not be rational even if voters are not
perfectly informed (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996). A companion paper (Gersbach and Schneider,
forthcoming) considers a simpler model with three parties to examine the effect of tax contracts on
election outcomes when voters vote strategically.
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process. This is justified by the indivisibility of the policy option d and the role of
ideology as a constraint on bargaining by parties, which is a prominent theme and
important argument in political economy (see Mueller (2003), Benabou (2008)). The
defining characteristic of party E is the policy d = d¯. Hence, for ideological reasons a
compromise in this political dimension is not possible for the extreme party.
We turn next to the formalization of government. There are several ways of modeling
coalition formation in multi-party democracies with proportional election schemes. We
assume that when a coalition forms, the parties allocate the seats in government in
proportion to their seats in parliament. That is, if parties k and j with parliamentary
seats spk and s
p
j form a government, the seats are allocated as follows:
8
sk =
spk
spk + s
p
j
S , sj =
spj
spk + s
p
j
S .
Our further procedure of forming a coalition government is based on the following
premises: First, the party with the highest number of seats is called upon to form a
coalition. This is usually done by the head of the state.9 Second, the coalition-forming
party will have an advantage in coalition negotiations.10 We capture this advantage
by allowing the coalition-forming party to approach a potential coalition partner and
to propose a specific tax rate. Third, actual negotiations on how to spend government
revenues are based on the amount of seats a party has gained in the election.11 Taking
all these premises together yields the following government formation process:
The party that has received the highest vote share is recognized as the first formateur
where ties are broken by fair randomization. Then the government forms according to
the following process:
Stage 3.1 The formateur chooses a potential coalition partner and suggests a tax
rate tF .
Stage 3.2a) If the coalition partner accepts tF :
Bargaining: Parties maximize
σkVk + σjVj
8For convenience, we allow sk and sj to be real numbers.
9See Mueller and Strom (2000) for recent examples in Western Europe.
10There is ample evidence that being the first-mover in coalition negotiations tends to be advanta-
geous (see e.g. Ansolabehere et al. (2005))
11This is a standard feature of coalition bargaining processes (see Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee
(2006), Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) and Roemer (2001))
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over (g, bj, bk, d = 0) subject to the budget constraint
tFY = (1 + λ)(g + sjbj + skbk),
where σk =
sk
sk+sj
represents party k’s share of seats within the coali-
tion.
Stage 3.2b) If the coalition partner does not accept tF :
Bargaining: Parties maximize
σkVk + σjVj
over (t, g, bj, bk, d = 0) subject to the budget constraint
tY = (1 + λ)(g + sjbj + skbk).
Stage 3.3 Vote of confidence. The proposed government coalition is elected if it
receives a majority of votes in parliament.
If the vote of confidence fails, the party with the second-highest vote share becomes the
new formateur and the process described above repeats itself. If every party has been
the formateur once and all votes of confidence have failed, a “caretaker government”
assumes power. The caretaker government consists of S bureaucrats and implements
policy vector (tct, gct, bct, dct) = (
A
yct
+ θ
2Y S
y2ct(1+λ)
, Y A
yct(1+λ)
, θ
2Y 2
y2ct(1+λ)
2 , 0). In other words, the
caretaker government acts like a single-party government of bureaucrats with the polit-
ical orientation yct. The rationale for our approach is as follows: The vote of confidence
is a standard feature of government formation protocols and ensures that any coalition
partner will obtain at least the value it could realize in the continuation of the game.
Stage 3.2 in the government formation process specifies that the two potential coali-
tion partners bargain over policy and that in this process their bargaining power cor-
responds to their share of seats in government. That coalitional bargaining maximizes
the weighted sum of the coalition’s parties is often assumed in the literature (e.g.,
Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002), Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee (2006), Bandyopadhyay
and Oak (2008), Roemer (2001).)
12
At the first stage 3.1, we allow the formateur to restrict bargaining to a certain tax
rate, in order to account for outside options of its potential coalition partner.12
3.4 Elections
We assume that the voters’ preferences are distributed in such a way that there are
two possible election outcomes. With probability pe the extreme party exceeds the
vote-share threshold required to enter parliament13, whereas the middle party M does
not. The resulting distribution of seats in parliament will be (spR, s
p
L, 0, s
p
E), where
spj > 0, j ∈ {R,L,E}. With complementary probability 1 − pe, party M will obtain
positive legislative weight but the extreme party will not. The parliament then consists
of (spR, s
p
L, s
p
M , 0).
14
We assume that spM < s
p
j , j ∈ {R,L} and – to simplify the exposition – that spR = spL as
well as spE = s
p
M . The latter ensures that the number of parliamentary seats for the large
parties are the same in both situations, i.e. regardless of whether the extreme party
enters parliament or not. Whenever the extreme party obtains seats in parliament, a
majority of the conventional parties can only be achieved by a grand coalition.
4 Government Formation without Tax Contracts
We start with the benchmark case where no tax contracts are allowed and the first
stage of the legislative game is absent. Recall that voters vote sincerely and choose the
party whose representative voter’s ideal point is closest to theirs. We start with the
outcome produced when comprehensive bargaining takes place in 3.2b.
12In greater detail, the rationale is as follows. As e.g. stressed by Roemer (2001, p. 283), maximizing
the weighted sum of the parties’ utilities without the possibility of the formateur to offer a tax rate
first may yield outcomes at stage 3.2b that are worse than a care-taker government for one of the
coalition members and thus could not be realized. In such circumstances, a care-taker government
would be pareto-inefficient for bargaining parties as, according to lemma 3 shown in the next section,
policies exists which make both parties better off than under a care-taker government. The asymmetric
treatment of stages 3.2a and 3.2b prevents this kind of pareto-inefficiency among the bargaining parties
as it selects one policy on the Pareto-frontier and precludes rejection of the policy by one bargaining
party.
13Many parliaments stipulate a vote-share threshold a party must achieve in order to enter parlia-
ment.
14Examples of such voter distributions, uncertainty, and vote share thresholds that produce the
assumed election outcomes are available upon request.
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Lemma 1
Suppose party k is the formateur and offers a coalition to party j. Then the bargaining
outcome in stage 3.2b is
takj =
A
yjk
+
θ2Y
(1 + λ)y2jk
(sjσ
2
j + skσ
2
k), (8)
gakj =
Y A
(1 + λ)yjk
, (9)
bak,kj =
σ2kθ
2Y 2
(1 + λ)2y2jk
, (10)
baj,kj =
σ2j θ
2Y 2
(1 + λ)2y2jk
, (11)
where yjk =
sjyj+skyk
sj+sk
.
The proof follows from the specification of the objective function of the coalition and
the budget constraint expressed in stage 3.2b of the government-formation process.
Note that the level of perks need not be the same for all parties in the governing
coalition, but reflect the relative seat shares in government σj of the two parties. For
later use, we note that the bargaining problem in stage 3.2b of the legislative game can
also be solved in two steps. In a first step, parties choose g, bj, bk for a given budget tY .
That is, they determine the optimal allocation of resources to the public good and the
perks for a given tax rate t. The solution of this optimization problem is unique and
independent of the coalition partners’ platforms yk and yj. Comparing (9) and (10),
we observe that the relation between the amount of the public good provided and the
parties’ perks per person is independent of the available budget and given by
g =
A
√
bk
σkθ
=
A
√
bj
σjθ
. (12)
Inserting this equation into the budget constraint, we obtain
tY = (1 + λ)(g +
(
θ
A
)2
(sjσ
2
j + skσ
2
k)g
2). (13)
This defines a bijection between taxes and public-good provision, tkj : R+ → R+, where
the indices k and j indicate the coalition partners.15 Use gkj(t) to denote the inverse
function, that is, the amount of the public good for a given tax rate. Using (12), we
15I.e. the mapping between t and g differs with the distribution of governmental seats, σk and σj .
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can now define the functions
bk,kj(t) =
(
θσk
A
)2
(gkj(t))
2, (14)
bj,kj(t) =
(
θσj
A
)2
(gkj(t))
2. (15)
Hence, the policy vector in stage 3.2b of a coalition of conventional parties (t, g, bk, bj , 0)
is fully characterized by the tax rate t and by the relation between the coalition parties’
governmental seats. The coalition maximizes the objective function with respect to t
using the solution of the first problem, gkj(t), bj,kj(t), bk,kj(t).
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We next characterize the outcome in stage 3.2a.
Lemma 2
(i) Suppose party k has offered a coalition and tF to party j. If party j accepts, the
bargaining outcome is (tF , gkj(tF ), bj,kj(tF ), bk,kj(tF )).
(ii) With a given budget tFY , a grand coalition provides a higher amount of the
public good than a small coalition, and a small coalition provides higher levels
of the public good than a single-party government: gRL(tF ) > gkM(tF ) > g
∗
k(tF );
k ∈ {R,L} and g∗k(tF ) denote public-good provision by a single-party government
for given tF .
The proof of lemma 2(ii) can be found in the appendix. In accordance with lemma 2(i),
we can abbreviate a policy outcome in stages 3.2a and 3.2b to (t, kj) which indicates
the tax rate and the coalition and uniquely determines all other values. Moreover, we
denote the value of a policy for a party k by Vk(t, kj). If the identity of the parties is
irrelevant, we may also denote the policy as (t, sc) or (t, gc) for a small and a grand
coalition respectively and will do so in the following when convenient. Further, let
Vk(ct) be k’s value of a caretaker government. The policy of a caretaker government
involves no perks and is characterized by a fixed tax rate and a corresponding level of
public goods.
We next determine the tax rate tF . We denote by h an arbitrary agent (voter or party)
in the society. In general, an agent’s problem in finding the most preferred tax rate of
a coalition of parties k and j can be witten as
max
t
Vh(t, kj) = Aln[gkj(t)]− tyh + 2θsh
√
bh,kj(t),
16With the previous notation this problem writes as
maxt σkVk(t, kj) + σjVj(t, kj) = Aln[gkj(t)]− t(σkyk + σjyj) + 2θ(skσk
√
bk,kj(t) + sjσj
√
bj,kj(t)).
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where sh > 0 if h ∈ {k, j} and is zero otherwise, i.e. if h were a voter or a party that
is not part of the government.
Before we discuss government formation without tax contracts, we can state the fol-
lowing lemma:
Lemma 3
There always exists a value of t such that Vk(t, kj) > Vk(ct) and Vj(t, kj) > Vj(ct),
k, j ∈ {R,M,L}.
The proof of lemma 3 can be found in the appendix. Intuitively, in a coalition govern-
ment the parties enjoy perks and a higher level of public-good provision than under a
caretaker government. This is a direct consequence of lemma 2(ii).
The equilibrium policy outcomes without tax contracts depend on the coalition that
assumes power. This in turn depends on the coalitions that are feasible. Two situa-
tions may arise that differ according to whether the extreme party is represented in
parliament (referred to as event E) or not (denoted by ¬E).
Suppose ¬E occurred. Then either L or R will be the first formateur. The formateur
will choose party M as a partner because the large parties’ relative weight in the
bargaining process is higher and the political positions between either of the large
parties and the middle party are closer. Accordingly, a large party can achieve a
higher utility with M than with the other large party. By contrast, in event E only
a grand coalition is possible. In either event, the first formateur has to consider the
outside options of its potential coalition partner k when proposing a tax rate at stage
3.1. Two outside options are available. The first is to decline the tax proposal and enter
into comprehensive bargaining at stage 3.2b, which yields value Vk(t
a
Fk, Fk). Second,
the potential coalition partner might disapprove the coalition government in the vote of
confidence and aim at another coalition government in the continuation of the game.
Let us denote the value that can be achieved after the vote of confidence failed by
V¯k. Now we can characterize the first formateur’s tax proposal at stage 3.1 of the
government formation process.
Proposition 1
At stage 3.1, the first formateur F will propose the following tax rates.
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(i) If the extreme party E does not enter parliament, it will offer to M
tncFM = argmax
t
VF (t, FM)
s.t. VM(t, FM) = max{VM(taFM , FM), V¯M},
(ii) If the extreme party E enters parliament, it will offer to the other large conven-
tional party j 6= F
tncRL = argmax
t
VF (t, RL)
s.t. Vj(t, RL) = max{Vj(taFj, RL), V¯j},
A proof of proposition 1 is provided in Appendix A.3 where the constraints of the max-
imization problem and the values of the outside options V¯ are derived. In both cases,
E and ¬E, the formateur’s suggested tax rate will be accepted by its coalition part-
ner and bargaining over public good provision and perks will take place at stage 3.2a.
Hence, we can summarize the expected policy outcomes of the government formation
stage in the following proposition:
Proposition 2
If the extreme party E does not possess legislative weight, the policy outcome will be
either (tncLM , LM) or (t
nc
RM , RM), each with a probability of
1
2
. If the extreme party is
part of the parliament, a grand coalition with a policy vector (tncLR, LR) will be formed.
5 Government Formation with Tax Contracts
5.1 General considerations
We will now analyse the game where the parties can voluntarily sign tax contracts.
By signing contracts, each party k restricts its tax policy to an interval τk = [tk, t¯k] to
which the party is committed if it is part of the government. A tax contract τk = [0, 1]
is equivalent to signing no contract. We assume the following:
Assumption 1
For each party k, t∗k ∈ τk.
This assumption implies that the parties’ ideal policy if they were the sole party in
power is feasible under the tax contract. The assumption can be justified either by the
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role of the party basis (the party rank and file would not accept an exclusion of the
party’s ideal point), or by ideological reasons as discussed earlier.17 As a consequence
of assumption 1 and sincere voting, tax contracts do not affect vote shares and the
number of seats in parliament. This keeps the focus of the analysis on government
formation.
5.2 Contract choice
We assume that, at the first stage of the legislative game, the contracts are chosen
sequentially:
Stage 1.1: With probability 0.5, party k ∈ {R,L} signs a contract containing a
choice τk.
Stage 1.2: Party j ∈ {R,L}, j 6= k signs τj .
Stage 1.3: Party M chooses τM .
The fact that the contract announcement game starts with the large parties first sim-
plifies our analysis.18 We neglect the contract choice of party E, as it does not affect
the game played by the other parties.
The sequential structure of the contract choice game can be justified as follows: First,
a simultaneous game seems rather unrealistic, as tax contracts have to be adopted at
party conventions. Even if tax contracts had to be signed simultaneously, there will be
earlier discussions within parties about which tax contract to sign and how to adjust
to the proposals of other parties. Second, as the equilibria in the sequential game
are also equilibria in a simultaneaous game (though by no means the only ones), the
outcomes of the sequential game could be interpreted as an equilibrium refinement to
the simultaneous game.
17A further reason outside the model could be that otherwise the extreme party would become too
strong because voters at the margins become dissatisfied with the conventional parties.
18It would not affect our main results qualitatively if all three parties had the same chance of being
the first to sign a contract.
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5.3 Equilibria with tax contracts
We will now proceed to solve the legislative game by backward induction. Consider
the last stage of the legislative game. The only difference in the outcomes with tax
contracts is that they satisfy the additional constraint that the tax rate must be within
the intersection of the contracted tax sets. In other words, with tax contracts the
comprehensive bargaining outcome of parties k and j in stage 3.2b is the solution to
the following problem:
max
t,g,bj ,bk
σkVk + σjVj
s.t. tY = (1 + λ)(g + sjbj + skbk),
t ∈ τk ∩ τj .
(16)
For stage 3.2a, when a tax rate tF ∈ τk ∩ τj has been offered by the formateur, parties
k and j maximize with respect to g, bj, bk. As the vote shares in the election are not
influenced by the parties’ contract choices, we can directly move to the first stage of
the legislative game where the parties decide on their tax contracts. We assume the
following tie-breaking rule:
Assumption 2
If a party is indifferent between two contracts τ 1k and τ
2
k , it will choose the contract
with the smaller range. E.g. if |τ 1k | < |τ 2k |, then τ 1k is chosen. If |τ 1k | = |τ 2k |, each
contract will be selected with a probability of 0.5.
We next introduce some notation and three conditions that will be crucial for the
type of equilibria that can occur. The definitions and conditions are given formally in
appendix A.4.
In the following, the index k ∈ {L,R} stands for the party that will sign its tax contract
first and j ∈ {L,R} , j 6= k for the party moving second. We use t∗h,co, h ∈ {R,M,L},
co ∈ {sc, gc} to denote the most preferred tax-rate of party h, given that it is part of
a (small or large) coalition. That is, t∗h,co is the tax rate that maximizes the utility of
h, under the condition that the coalition, co, maximizes (16) given this tax rate. For
example, t∗M,sc stands for the most preferred tax rate of the middle party when it is
part of a small coalition.19 The most interesting cases for our analysis are societies
that exhibit a degree of political polarization captured by the following assumption:
19Note that this tax rate does not depend on the coalition partner as both L and R occupy the
same number of seats in parliament.
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Assumption 3
The difference between the incomes of the representative voters of the parties is such
that the parties’ most preferred tax rates – given that they are part of a coalition
government – satisfy t∗R,sc ≤ t∗M,sc ≤ t∗L,sc and t∗R,gc ≤ t∗L,gc.20
Further, it can be shown that t∗M,sc < t
∗
M , as will become clear in section 6. We introduce
particular tax rates. We use t∗M,(sc) to denote the bargaining outcome constrained by
τM = [t
∗
M,sc, t
∗
M ] between M and a formateur who is either L or R. Note that t
∗
M,(sc)
may differ from t∗M,sc when L is the formateur and forms a coalition with M.
With regard to party k’s decision problem at the first stage of the contract-choice game,
let tkj be the most preferred tax rate of party k in a grand coalition with j, given that
j will include this tax rate in its tax contract. We use the superscript −, (t−kj), to
indicate whether tkj is in the interval [t
∗
k, t
∗
M,sc), i.e. tkj is closer to k’ s ideal policy t
∗
k
than t∗M,sc, and +, (t
+
kj), whenever it is in [t
∗
j , t
∗
M,sc), i.e. tkj is farther from k’ s ideal
policy than t∗M,sc.
We use t′j to denote the most preferred tax rate of party j within a given tax set τk,
such that k enjoys at least as much utility as from a caretaker government. Further,
for a given tax contract of k, tjM is the most preferable tax rate for party j in a small
coalition to ensure that M is still willing to coalesce with j rather than with k.
With this notation we can distinguish the following conditions: To sharpen intuition,
some conditions are illustrated for the case where k = R and j = L.
Condition C1: For all t ∈ [t∗k, t∗M,sc], Vj(t, RL) < Vj(ct).
This condition states that party j will prefer a caretaker government to a
grand coalition with a policy characterized by a tax rate that is farther from
t∗j than t
∗
M,sc.
Condition C2: If k chooses [t∗k, t
−
kj], where t
−
kj ∈ [t∗k, t∗M,sc), party j will choose [t∗j , t−kj]
instead of [t∗j , tjM ].
This means that party j will value certain participation in a small coalition
with t∗M,(sc) in event ¬E and a grand coalition with t−kj in E more than
certain participation in a small coalition with tjM in ¬E but a caretaker
government in E.
20As will become clear later, in the case of symmetric vote shares for the large parties, the latter
condition follows directly from yR ≥ yL.
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✲tt∗R,gct
∗
R t
−
RL t
∗
M,sct
∗
M t
∗
L,gct
∗
LtLM
τM
τLτR
≻L
τM
τLτR
Figure 1: Illustration of Condition C2
The label ≻L means that the set of tax contracts at the top is preferred by party L to the
set of tax contracts below ≻L.
Condition C3: Party k prefers [t∗k, t
∗
M,sc] to [t
∗
k, t
−
kj].
This means that k’s expected utility from potential participation in a small
coalition with t∗M,sc in ¬E and a grand coalition with t∗M,sc in E21 is higher
than the utility from a small coalition of j and M with t∗M,(sc) in event ¬E
and a grand coalition with t−kj in E.
✲
tt∗R,gct
∗
R t
−
RL t
∗
M,sct
∗
M t
∗
L,gct
∗
L
τM
τLτR
≻R
τM
τLτR
Figure 2: Illustration of Condition C3
The label ≻R means that the set of tax contracts at the top is preferred by party R to the
set of tax contracts below ≻R.
Conditions C2 and C3 are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. We begin our characterization
of the equilibrium tax-contract choices with the following lemma:
21To be more precise, there will be a grand coalition with t′j where t
′
j = t
∗
M,sc if Vk(t
∗
M,sc, RL) ≥
Vk(ct) and t
′
j 6= t∗M,sc otherwise.
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Lemma 4
If the extreme party does not enter parliament (event ¬E) and τR ∩ τL 6= ∅, the
equilibrium outcome will be a small coalition.
The proof can be found in the appendix. The lemma expresses that even if a grand
coalition is possible in event ¬E, the formateur will prefer a small coalition. With
this lemma and the above conditions, we can now characterize the equilibria where the
label “u” denotes equilibrium choices.
Proposition 3
There are three types of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria:
1.
τuk = [t
∗
k, t
+
kj],
τuj = [t
∗
j , t
∗
M,sc],
τuM = [t
∗
M , t
∗
M,sc],
if and only if (C1).
2.
τuk = [t
∗
k, t
∗
M,sc],
τuj = [t
∗
j , t
′
L],
τuM = [t
∗
M , t
∗
M,sc],
if and only if ¬(C1) and (C3) or ¬(C1) and ¬(C2).
3.
τuk = [t
∗
k, t
−
kj],
τuj = [t
∗
j , t
−
kj],
τuM = [t
∗
M , t
∗
M,(sc)],
if and only if ¬(C1), (C2), and ¬(C3).
The proof is given in the appendix. The intuition of the equilibria can be summarized
as follows:
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If the value of a caretaker government to party j is sufficiently high, j would prefer a
caretaker government in the event E to a grand coalition with a tax rate farther away
from its ideal point than t∗M,sc. Hence, party k includes tkj > t
∗
M,sc into its tax set, as
it will be better off with a grand coalition government with tkj than with a caretaker
government according to lemma 3. Party j, however, still includes t∗M,sc in τj in order to
be able to form a small coalition with M in the event ¬E22 and equilibrium 1 realizes.
The equilibrium choices are illustrated in figure 3.
✲
tt∗R,gc t
∗
R t
∗
M,sct
∗
M t
∗
L,gc t
∗
Lt
+
RL
τuM
τuL
τuR
Figure 3: Illustration of Equilibrium 1
If a caretaker government possesses a small enough value for j, then either equilibrium
2 or 3 will be realized. Which of the two finally occurs depends on the tradeoff reflected
in (C3).
If (C3) holds, a grand coalition with t∗M,sc in E and potential participation in a small
coalition with t∗M,sc in ¬E creates higher value for party k than a more favorable policy
in a grand coalition in E but no possibility to form a small coalition in ¬E. This yields
equilibrium 2. In the opposite case (i.e. (C3) does not hold), equilibrium 3 will be
realized. Note that (C2) must also hold to ensure the existence of equilibrium 3. For an
illustration of Equilibrium 3, see the situation depicted in figure 2 below the preference
sign ≻R.
Given the tax-set τk = [t
∗
k, t
∗
M,sc], party k will induce a caretaker government by denying
the vote of confidence if τj = [t
∗
j , t
∗
M,sc] and Vk(t
∗
M,sc, RL) < Vk(ct). Hence, in equilib-
rium 2, we have t′j 6= t∗M,sc if Vk(t∗M,sc, RL) < Vk(ct) and t′j = t∗M,sc otherwise.23 The
tax-set choices in equilibrium 2 with t′j = t
∗
M,sc are illustrated in figure 2 above the
22Note that j always has the possibility of inducing a caretaker government by rejecting a coalition
agreement in stage 3 when the vote of confidence takes place. Hence k cannot gain by reducing its
contract to [t∗k, t
∗
M,sc].
23Of course we must also have ¬(C1) for equilibrium 2 to come about.
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preference sign. The figure below depicts the case t′j 6= t∗M,sc.
✲
tt∗R,gc t
∗
R t
∗
M,sct
∗
M t
∗
L,gc t
∗
Lt
′
L
τuM
τuL
τuR
Figure 4: Illustration of Equilibrium 2
From the proposition we can immediately obtain
Corollary 1
In an equilibrium with tax contracts, a caretaker government will never assume power.
The set of equilibria can be further reduced by the following assumption.
Assumption 4
For any tax-rate t ∈ [t∗R, t∗L], the large parties will value a grand coalition more highly
than a caretaker government.
We obtain
Corollary 2
Suppose assumption 4 holds. Then,
(i) only equilibrium 2, where t′j = t
∗
M,sc, and equilibrium 3 can occur.
(ii) for each of the large parties, there exists a critical value pˆe,k, such that if k is
the first to choose a tax contract, equilibrium 2 will be realized for pe < pˆe,k and
equilibrium 3 for pe ≥ pˆe,k.
(iii) pˆe,k is decreasing in the distance between yk and yM for given yM and yj.
The reasoning in corollary 2 is as follows: As any coalition is better than a caretaker
government, condition C1 is violated, which rules out equilibrium 1. Further, assump-
tion 4 implies that Vk(t
∗
M,sc, RL) > Vk(ct) and hence t
′
j = t
∗
M,sc.
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As equilibrium 2 (illustrated in figure 5.3) will come about if (C3) holds, pˆe,k is defined
as the value of pe for which condition ¬(34) in appendix A.4 holds with equality. This
is equivalent to the condition that (C3) holds for pe < pˆe,k but not for pe ≥ pˆe,k.
Finally, if the distances between the platforms of the large parties and party M increase,
a grand coalition with a policy characterized by t∗M,sc becomes less attractive for the
large parties relative to their own best choice t−kj.
24 Hence it becomes more attractive
to forgo participation in a small coalition with t∗M,sc and to opt for a more favorable
policy in a grand coalition. Hence the critical value pˆe,k declines.
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Corollary 2 also implies that from an ex ante perspective, that is, before the first
mover in the contract-choice game is known, the probability that equilibrium 2 will be
realized is 1 if pe < mink∈{R,L} pˆe,k, 0.5 if pˆe,h > pe > pˆe,n , h, n ∈ {R,L}, h 6= n, and 0
if pe > maxk∈{R,L} pˆe,k.
We summarize the policy outcomes in the next proposition:
Proposition 4
The equilibria at the contract-choice stage lead to the following policy outcomes of the
legislative game:
Equilibrium 1: ¬E: (t∗M,sc, sc)
E: (t+kj, gc)
Equilibrium 2: ¬E: (t∗M,sc, sc)
E: (t′L, gc)
Equilibrium 3: ¬E: (t∗M,(sc), sc)
E: (t−kj, gc)
6 The Effects of Tax Contracts on Policy Outcomes
6.1 The set-up
In this section, we identify two key effects of tax contracts on equilibrium policy out-
comes. This can be done most easily in situations where assumption 4 and assumption
5 (below) hold.
24The intuition of the underlying trade-off as captured in condition C3 is described directly below
proposition 3.
25A formal proof follows directly from differentiating (C3) as given in appendix A.4 with respect to
yk. Details are available on request.
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Assumption 5
The conventional parties’ platforms (yj, 1) are distributed such that the positions yR
and yL are symmetric around yM , i.e. M’s utility level in a coalition with R is the
same as in a coalition with L.26 Moreover, M prefers a coalition with one of the large
conventional parties to a caretaker government.
The two assumptions imply that, according to proposition 1 and its proof as well
as proposition 2, the equilibrium policy without tax contracts will be (taLM , LM) or
(taRM , RM) each with a probability of
1
2
when E does not enter parliament and a grand
coalition with (taRM , RM) will occur when E enters parliament. Moreover, according to
proposition 3 and corollary 1, the equilibrium policy outcomes with tax contracts will
be either k’s most preferred implementable tax rate in the event of a grand coalition
or M’s most preferred implementable tax rate in the event of a small coalition.
The addition ’implementable’ refers to the fact that a party’s most preferred tax rate
may not be the coalition’s policy, as due to assumption 1 the party is not entirely free
with respect to the choice of its contracted set of tax rates. The constraint imposed by
assumption 1 is called the implementation constraint. As it will become obvious in the
following paragraphs, the most preferred tax rates of a party k, k ∈ {R,L,M} if it is
part of a coalition is always lower than if it were the sole party in power, i.e. t∗k,co < t
∗
k.
This implies that there is one situation in which the implementation constraint has bite,
which is if R is the first to choose its tax contract and equilibrium 3 comes about, i.e.
pˆe,R < pe. In this case, R cannot choose t
∗
R,gc in event E, while in ¬E a small coalition
of L and M will implement t∗M,(sc), which differs from t
∗
M,sc. To identify the effects of
tax contracts on policy outcomes we abstract from this implementability restriction.
We will discuss what would change with its inclusion at the end of this section. At this
point, we can forestall that the qualitative results remain unaffected.
We can then use (t∗h,cˆo, co) to describe the equilibrium outcomes with tax contracts,
where h ∈ {R,L,M} and cˆo, co are the labels for the type of coalition, i.e. cˆo, co ∈
{sc, gc}. In order to compare the policy outcomes of the regimes with and without tax
26More formally, this assumption can be written as: The parties’ platforms (yj , 1), j ∈ {L,R}
satisfy VM (t
a
RM , RM) = VM (t
a
LM , LM).
26
contracts, it will be useful to introduce the following problem:27
max
t,g,bk,bj
A ln g − t(αyk + (1− α)yj) + 2θ(αsk
√
bk + (1− α)sj
√
bj) (17)
s.t. tY = (1 + λ)(g + skbk + sjbj), (18)
g =
A
√
bk
θσk
, (19)
g =
A
√
bj
θσj
. (20)
In this formulation, α ∈ [0, 1] represents the weight given to party k’s preferences. For
α = σk the maximization problem is identical to the bargaining problem without tax
contracts. For α = 1, it reflects k’s problem of choosing its most preferred tax rate,
given that it is part of a coalition government with j.
In the following, it will be convenient to express the income levels as the relative
distance from the average voter’s income. For example, party L’s representative voter
would be characterized by lL =
yL
y¯
, where y¯ denotes the income of the average voter.
Similarly, we define lkj = σklk + σjlj and thus have ykj = (σklk + σjlj)y¯ = lkj y¯. We
refer to lk as the political orientation of party k.
With this definition, the solution to the maximization problem can be characterized
by the following equation system:
y¯
Y
= Gkj(g;α), (21)
bk =
(
θσkg
A
)2
, (22)
bj =
(
θσjg
A
)2
, (23)
tY = (1 + λ)(g + skbk + sjbj), (24)
where
Gkj(g;α) =
1
αlk + (1− α)lj
A2 + 2θ2g[(1− α)sjσj + αskσk]
A(1 + λ)g
0.5A2
0.5A2 + θ2(sjσ2j + skσ
2
k)g
.
Recall that σk =
sk
S
. We note that the maximization problem is strictly concave and
hence possesses a unique solution. This can be verified as follows: Equations (22)
and (23) can be interpreted as bijections bk,kj(g) and bj,kj(g) in the positive quadrant.
Inserting (22) and (23) into (24) we obtain tkj(g) as already defined in section 4. Hence,
as ∂G(g;α)
∂g
< 028, equation (21) yields a unique optimal amount of the public good,
27The problem could also be written as maxt αVk(t, kj) + (1 − α)Vj(t, kj).
28The verification of this claim is available on request.
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implying that the problem solution is a unique policy vector.29 The term Gkj(g;α)
captures the way in which public-good provision is related to the weights placed on
the parties’ preferences. For later use we also note that the amount of perks per
unit of public-good provision is lower in a grand coalition than in a small coalition,
tgc(g) < tsc(g). This follows from lemma 2(ii). Intuitively, the lemma’s statement that,
for a given tax rate, public-good provision is higher in a grand coalition than in a small
coalition implies that the amount of perks per unit of public-good provision is higher in
a small coalition than in a grand coalition. Consequently, to provide a certain amount
of the public good, a small coalition would levy higher taxes than a grand coalition.
6.2 Policy shift and perks effect
The difference in tax rates implemented by a coalition government formed (a) without
and (b) with tax contracts can be attributed to two sources. One is the coalition’s
political orientation. This may differ because tax contracts can give a single party
considerable power to influence bargaining in its favor. This we call the policy-shift
effect. The other effect subsumes all the differences in tax rates with and without
tax contracts that result from the parties’ having preferences for perks. That is, it
would vanish if θ, the parties’ weight on perks in their utility functions, were zero.
Accordingly, this effect is referred to as the perks effect. It can be broken down further
into three sub-effects discussed later.
We will now identify the policy-shift effect and the perks effect using the first-order
conditions of problem (17). We start with the situation where pe is sufficiently large for
equilibrium 3 to be realized. In this situation, the perks effect only comprises two sub-
effects. Then we introduce the third sub-effect that additionally arises in equilibrium
2. Thereafter we will give a formal definition of the policy-shift effect and the perks
effect and discuss their direction.
Suppose pe is high enough for equilibrium 3 to be realized. The difference between the
policy outcomes without and with tax contracts can be identified by the differences
29Another way to show uniqueness is to examine the second derivative. We use
the constraints to write the objective function with only one control, g: Alng −[
(1 + λ)(g +
(
θ
A
)2
(skσ
2
k + sjσ
2
j )g
2
]
αyk+(1−α)yj
Y
+ 2 θ
2
A
(αskσk + (1− α)sjσj)g. The second derivative
is − A
g2
− 2 ( θ
A
)2
(1 + λ)
αyk+(1−α)yj
Y
(skσ
2
k + sjσ
2
j ), which is negative for any g > 0.
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between Gkj(g; σk) and Gkj(g; 1). In particular,
Gkj(g; σk) =
1
lkj
A
(1 + λ)g
!
=
y¯
Y
, (25)
Gkj(g; 1) =
1
lk
A
(1 + λ)g
0.5A2 + skσkθ
2g
0.5A2 + skσ2kθ
2g
(
1− sjσ
2
j θ
2g
0.5A2 + sjσ2j θ
2g + skσ2kθ
2g
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (g,σk)
!
=
y¯
Y
.
(26)
From equations (25) and (26) we can identify two reasons why policy outcomes with
tax contracts may differ from those without. First, without contracts the political
orientation of a coalition government is a convex combination between the two coalition
partners, e.g. lkj. With tax contracts, it is that of a single party, e.g. lk. We refer to
this difference as the policy-shift effect of tax contracts. The second difference arises
from the term P (g, σk) as defined in equation (26) and is called the perks effect.
Using (22), the first quotient of P (g, σk) can be rewritten as
A+ 2skθ
√
bk
A+ 2skσkθ
√
bk
. (27)
This term reflects the relation between the weight that party k attaches to perks in its
utility function and the weight given to its perks in coalition bargaining. Hence, this
term is always greater than 1. That is, ceteris paribus party k would like to implement a
higher tax rate than the coalition government without tax contracts in order to finance
more perks. This is the first sub-effect of the perks effect. The second sub-effect is
reflected in the second multiplier of P (g, σk), which is always smaller than 1. It reflects
a negative externality, as with the budget for a coalition government, party k has to
finance the coalition partner’s perks although these are not part of its utility. The first
force becomes dominant if σk is high, as the negative externality then becomes small.
The opposite occurs when σk is small. This is expressed in the following lemma which
shows that forces balance at σk = 0.5.
Lemma 5
P (g, σk) < 1, if σk ∈ (0, 0.5)
P (g, σk) = 1, if σk = 0.5
P (g, σk) > 1, if σk ∈ (0.5, 1)
The proof is given in the appendix. Lemma 5 implies that if we compare a small
coalition formed under tax contracts with one formed without tax contracts and if we
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suppose that both had the same political orientation (in our case lM), then the amount
of public-good provision is lower with tax contracts than without, as σM < 0.5. The
reason is that the (negative) externality dominates the (positive) under-representation
of perks in P (g, σk).
We now consider the situation where pe is sufficiently small for equilibrium 2 to be
realized. Here we observe the third sub-effect on perks. It results from the different
amounts of perks associated with public-good provision in small and grand coalitions.
To precisely identify this sub-effect, let us denote the bargaining solution of (25) as a
function of the coalition’s political orientation: ga(l), where ga(lkj) = g
a
kj. Further, the
solution to (26) is referred to as gk,kj. In equilibrium 2, a grand coalition implements a
tax rate t∗M,sc that can be written as tsc(gM,sc). Although a grand coalition without tax
contracts and political orientation lM would implement g
a(lM) > gM,sc, this does not
necessarily involve tgc(g
a(lM)) > tsc(gM,sc). As indicated previously, the reason is that,
in a grand coalition, the relationship of perks per unit of public-good provision is lower
than in a small coalition. Accordingly, this sub-effect is only present in equilibrium 2
when a grand coalition is formed.
Next we give a formal definition of the effects. For this purpose, let us write tkj(l) for
tkj(g
a(l)).
Definition 1
Let t∗h,co, h ∈ {R,M,L} be the resulting tax rate of a coalition of parties k and j under
tax contracts.
Policy-shift effect: ∆tps = tkj(lh)− tnckj
Perks effect: ∆tpr = t
∗
h,co − tkj(lh)
Note that k, j, h ∈ {R,M,L} and k 6= j. To illustrate the effects, consider the case of
a grand coalition in equilibrium 2. The tax rate in the equilibrium with tax contracts
would be t∗M,sc. Consequently, h = M . A grand coalition with political orientation
lM would like to implement tRL(lM). As in a grand coalition P (g, σk) = 1 (see lemma
5), the first two sub-effects of the perks effect cancel each other out. The remaining
(third) sub-effect is captured by t∗M,sc − tRL(lM). Clearly, as with a given coalition
kj the tax rate maps one-to-one into the corresponding public-good provision and
the corresponding amount of perks via gkj(t), bj,kj(t), bk,kj(t), the effects can also be
formulated in the latter dimensions.
Intuitively, the policy-shift effect represents the difference between the tax rate without
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tax contracts and the comprehensive bargaining outcome of that coalition if it had a
political orientation lh. As, due to assumption 4, the policy of a coalition formed
without tax contracts is the comprehensive bargaining outcome, the policy-shift effect
would vanish for lh = lkj. The perks effect captures the difference between the actual
policy of a government formed under tax contracts and the comprehensive bargaining
outcome of this coalition if it had the political orientation of party h. This difference
comprises the three sub-effects described above and would vanish if θ were zero.
Concerning the signs of the effects, we know from section 4 that the bargaining solution
of a coalition with a political orientation geared more towards the rich would provide
fewer public goods and vice versa. With tax contracts, a single party has more power,
but it still is the case that
∂gk,kj
∂lk
< 0. Hence, whether the policy-shift effect is positive
or negative depends on the direction of the shift, i.e. towards which party’s preferences
the policy shifts. According to our previous observations, the perks effect can also go
both ways.
Proposition 5
The perks effect is negative in event ¬E. In E, it is zero if equilibrium 3 is realized and
ambiguous in its sign if equilibrium 2 occurs.
A detailed look at the cases can be summarized as follows: Independent of pe, in small
coalitions a policy shift towards M’s preferences occurs and – as σM < 0.5 – there is a
negative perks effect. There are differences between equilibria 2 and 3 with respect to
the situation where a grand coalition comes about. In equilibrium 2, the policy shift
is still towards the center. However, the perks effect can be positive due to a different
relationship between public-good provision and perks in small and grand coalitions. If
pe is sufficiently high for equilibrium 3 to occur, a grand coalition implies only a policy
shift to either the left or right and no perks effect due to symmetric seat shares.
From an ex-ante perspective, we can say that the perks effect tends to be negative.
The reason is that the perks effect is at least weakly negative in all situations except
one. Only in a grand coalition in equilibrium 2 will the perks effect not necessarily
be positive, and the probability of this situation arising (pe), must be low, because
otherwise equilibrium 3 would come about, and the perks effect will be weakly negative
again. Hence in the expectation operator the weight attached to a possibly positive
perks effect is low.
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6.3 Discussion
The policy-shift effect and the perks effect have been identified in a particular setting.
In this section we discuss whether the definition is robust for more general settings and
how a relaxation of assumptions 5 and 4 influences the sizes of the effects.
First, we address the question whether definition 1 also captures the effects if we relax
assumption 5. For example, we assume that k’s platform is farther away from M’s
than that of j so that M’s utility in a small coalition with j is higher than with k. We
answer this question in the affirmative. In event ¬E, even the sizes of the effects should
remain the same. To see this, suppose the extreme party did not enter parliament and
party k became the first formateur. In the regime without tax contracts, which tax
rate would k offer to M? Due to the parties’ single peaked preferences on tax rates if
a small coalition is realized, there will be a unique tax rate that maximizes k’s utility
under the restriction that M enjoys at least the utility level of a small coalition with
j. This tax rate must be identical with the bargaining outcome if k’s platform were
symmetric with j’s around M. Hence the size of the policy-shift effect would not change
in this situation.
Second, we ask whether the implementation restriction has any influence on the pre-
viously identified effects. A comparison of the policy of a single-party government of
party k with the most preferred policy of k in a coalition government makes it clear
that t∗k,gc < t
∗
k.
30 This means that the implementation restriction only has influence in
equilibrium 3 if party R is the first to choose its tax contract. Then R would not be
able to implement t∗R,gc in a grand coalition but only t
∗
R, and a small coalition would
implement t∗M,(sc) instead of t
∗
M,sc. Using definition 1, the implementation restriction
would only affect the perks effect but not the policy-shift effect. The direction is clear:
the magnitude of a negative perks effect will become smaller (or the effect may even
turn positive), and a positive perks effect will increase. Hence we conclude that the
sum of the policy-shift effect and the perks effect is smaller in a situation where the
implementation restriction has bite.
Third, suppose that assumption 4 does not hold, i.e. that for some tax rates at least
30Comparing the first-order condition of a single-party government (5) with (26) reveals that gk ≥
gk,co. From a comparison of the budget constraints we obtain
(1 + λ)(g + sk(θσkg/A)
2 + sj(θσjg/A)
2)/Y = tkj(g) < tk(g) = (1 + λ)(g + sk(θg/A)
2)/Y
for a given value of g. These two arguments taken together yield t∗k,co < t
∗
k.
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one of the large parties prefers a caretaker government to a grand coalition. This
implies that equilibrium 1 and equilibrium 2 with t′j 6= t∗M,sc could occur and that
t−kj 6= t∗k,gc. The major difference to the setting with assumption 4 is that policy shifts
towards the left and right in equilibrium 3 are no longer possible. The simple reason
is that such a policy shift must give both coalition partners a higher utility than a
caretaker government, otherwise the vote of confidence would fail.31 This implies that
the policies of a grand coalition government formed with or without tax contracts show
little if any differences. However, in event ¬E, the policy-shift effect and the perks effect
will remain unchanged.
7 Welfare Comparison
In this section we examine the consequences of tax contracts for the aggregate welfare
of voters measured by a utilitarian welfare function:
W =
∫ ymax
ymin
(A ln g − ty)f(y)dy.
For a given policy vector (t, g, b, 0), this transforms to W = A ln g − tY = Alng − ty¯.
Recall that y¯ denotes the average income in the economy. Hence, we can take the utility
of the average-income voter as a measure of overall welfare.32 His most preferred policy
if a coalition of parties k and j comes about is therefore characterized by
y¯
Y
= 1 =
A
(1 + λ)g
0.5A2
0.5A2 + skσ2kθ
2g
(
1− sjσ
2
j θ
2g
0.5A2 + sjσ2j θ
2g + skσ2kθ
2g
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pv(g,σk)
, (28)
and (22), (23), and (24).33 Note that in the first-order condition of the voter’s problem
Pv(g, σk) < 1, as perks are weighted too heavily in governmental bargaining over and
against his preference for zero perks. Hence the average-income voter would like a lower
level of public-good provision than a government with the same political orientation
(l=1). The immediate upshot of this is
31In fact, a comparison between the equilibrium policies in a grand coalition formed with and
without tax contracts in the situation where the caretaker government is more favorable for one of
the large parties and ∃k ∈ {R,L} with Vk(taRL, RL) < Vk(ct) reveals that tkj = tncRL if j is the first
formateur without tax contracts and t′j = t
nc
RL if k is the first formateur without tax contracts.
32The problem of a voter with yi = y¯ is maxt,g,bj ,bk A ln g − ty¯ s.t. (22), (23), (24).
33In equation (28), we indicate the importance of the relation between average income and total
income which is 1 due to our normalization of the size of the population to measure 1.
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Lemma 6
Only a coalition with a political orientation l > 1 can achieve the welfare-optimal level
of the public good.
We now inquire into the political constellations (lR, lM , lL) under which government
formation with tax contracts yields higher welfare than government formation without
tax contracts. Let us again consider situations where assumptions 4 and 5 hold. For
the comparison we have to distinguish whether an equilibrium of type 2 or 3 comes
about in the regime with tax contracts.
If pe is not too high and thus equilibrium 2 occurs with tax contracts, these yield higher
welfare if and only if
peUy¯(t
∗
M,sc, gc) + (1− pe)Uy¯(t∗M,sc, sc) (29)
> peUy¯(t
nc
RL, gc) +
1− pe
2
[Uy¯(t
nc
RM , sc) + Uy¯(t
nc
LM , sc)],
where Uy¯(t, co) denotes the utility of the average-income voter derived from the policy
(t, co). If equilibrium 3 occurs, tax contracts yield higher welfare if and only if
pe
2
[Uy¯(t
∗
L,gc, gc) + Uy¯(t
∗
R, gc)] +
1− pe
2
[Uy¯(t
∗
M,sc, RM) + Uy¯(t
∗
M,(sc), LM)] (30)
> peUy¯(t
nc
RL, gc) +
1− pe
2
[Uy¯(t
nc
RM , sc) + Uy¯(t
nc
LM , sc)]
holds.34
To identify the political constellations (lR, lM , lL) under which these inequalities hold,
we define the political distance of the large parties as
∆l := lR − lL.
∆l measures political polarization.
35 We obtain
Proposition 6
(i) If pe < mink∈{R,L} pˆe,k, tax contracts will improve welfare for sufficiently large ∆l.
(ii) If pe is sufficiently large, tax contracts will lower welfare for large values of ∆l.
34These conditions also apply without the symmetry assumption for the large parties’ platforms.
Note that, in equation 30, we have t∗R instead of t
∗
R,gc due to the implementation restriction.
35Note that for a given position of the middle party, lM , the positions of R and L are fully specified
by ∆l due to assumption 5.
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The proof is provided in appendix A.8.
Intuitively, if pe is small enough for equilibrium 2 to occur with tax contracts (case (i)),
such contracts will guarantee a policy characterized by t∗M,sc independently of whether
the extreme party enters the legislature. Without contracts, the policies are relatively
moderate in a grand coalition, but more to the left or right in small coalitions, de-
pending on how strong the political polarization of the large parties is. Hence for large
political differences ∆l, the average voter’s utility from the small coalitions’ policies
without tax contracts is smaller than with tax contracts.
The result is the opposite in case (ii), where pe is large enough for equilibrium 3 to
occur. Then, in highly polarized societies, we would have widely diverging policies with
tax contracts in the case of event E. Although the small coalitions’ policies will also
become more extreme without contracts, they are more moderate as party M still has
a certain say in coalition bargaining. Hence, when pe is sufficiently large, tax contracts
will lower social welfare.
If we relax the symmetry assumption with respect to the parties’ platforms, the lowest
degree of political polarization that still satisfies assumption 3 would imply t∗M,sc ≈ t∗R,sc
and lL ≈ lM . We denote this degree of polarization by ∆minl . In this case, we have
Proposition 7
If pe < mink∈{R,L} pˆe,k, lM ≤ 1 and∆l close to∆minl , tax contracts are welfare-improving
for tncRL > t
∗
M,sc and otherwise yield (weakly) lower welfare than a regime without tax
contracts.
The proof can be found in appendix A.9.
Intuitively, if political polarization is very low, the perks effect plays a central role.
If pe < mink∈{R,L} pˆe,k equilibrium 2 will occur if tax contracts are allowed. As ∆
min
l
implies that g∗R,sc ≈ g∗M,sc, it follows that g∗M,sc = gncRM = gncLM implying a tax rate
of t∗M,sc. Since lM ≤ 1, the average voter’s preferred level of public-good provision
is lower than that desired by the middle party in a small coalition: gy¯ < g
∗
M,sc or
ty¯ < t
∗
M,sc.
36 However, only if tncRL > t
∗
M,sc will the perks effect be sufficiently negative
for tax contracts to be welfare-improving. The opposite occurs for tncRL < t
∗
M,sc. Note
that lM ≤ 1 is the plausible case, as median income is usually below average income
36Although it can be shown that for ∆l close enough to ∆
min
l , g
nc
RL > g
∗
M,sc, this does not necessarily
imply tncRL > t
∗
M,sc due to the different relation between perks per unit of public-good provision in
grand and small coalitions.
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and the middle party’s political position is likely to be close to that of the median
voter.
8 Numerical Examples
In this section we illustrate our welfare analysis with some numerical examples in order
to assess the magnitudes of the effects. We consider situations in which assumptions
4 and 5 hold and use a ’baseline’ society, which we examine for different degrees of
political polarization and different probabilities of the extreme party entering parlia-
ment. The baseline society is characterized by the following parameter values: A = 10,
λ = 0.05, θ = 0.005, Y = 300, S = 10, lM = 1. We assume that the large parties re-
ceive a vote share of 40% each. Consequently, the small middle party and the extreme
party will obtain 20% of the votes if they enter parliament.
We let lM = 1 and start with an initial lR value of 1.2. The corresponding political
orientation of the left party, lL, is implied by the symmetry assumption 5, which then
yields the initial level of polarization ∆l. Each iteration increases lR by 0.25 and the
corresponding position of party L is adjusted so that symmetry holds. We consider 50
iterations leading to a maximal degree of polarization of 13.26. We indicate the results
for cases where the probability of the extreme party entering parliament is low (8%),
medium (33%) and high (75%). As the expected welfare under tax contracts depends
on whether equilibrium 2 or 3 will come about, we define the binary variables D2R and
D2L, which assume the value 1 if equilibrium 2 occurs when R (L) is the first party to
choose its tax contracts, and zero otherwise. The expected welfare of a regime with
tax contracts can then be written as
EWtc :=
pe
2
[(D2R +D2L)Uy¯(t
∗
M,sc, gc) + (1−D2R)Uy¯(t∗R, gc) + (1−D2L)Uy¯(t∗L,gc, gc)]
+
1− pe
2
[(1 +D2R)Uy¯(t
∗
M,sc, sc) + (1−D2R)Uy¯(t∗M,(sc), sc)].
Recall that expected welfare without tax contracts (EWnc) is given by the right-hand
sides of (29) and (30). We start with the case where the probability of the extreme
party entering parliament is low.
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8.1 pe low
For this case, our analytical results predict that equilibrium 2 will occur, inducing
welfare improvements from tax contracts for high degrees of polarization.
EWtc
EWnc
∆l2 4 6 8 10 12 14
15
20
25
30
35
40
Figure 5: Expected welfare with and without tax contracts when pe is low
As figure 5 illustrates, with tax contracts, both a small coalition and a grand coalition
would implement t∗M,sc, which is equal to t
∗
M,sc = 3.14%. Accordingly, the expected wel-
fare level is independent of the degree of political polarization. By contrast, welfare is
decreasing without tax contracts since the equilibrium policies are convex combinations
of the coalition partners’ preferred policies and the distance between them increases
with increasing political polarization. In our example, a coalition of R and M would
choose a tax rate of 2.6% for the lowest level of polarization and 0.3% for the highest
polarization level of 13.26 if no tax contracts can be written. A coalition between L
and M starts out at a tax rate of 3.73% for the lowest polarization level and ends up
at 11.9% if the degree of polarization is maximal. Accordingly, expected welfare gains
of a regime with tax contracts increases with ∆l as depicted in the upper left part of
figure 6.
The graph in the upper right part of figure 6 displays the welfare difference associated
with the policy-shift effect, while the graph on the lower left displays the expected
welfare difference resulting from the perks effect. We observe that the welfare impact
of the perks effect is quite low. Only in societies with very small polarization does
it match the welfare impact of the policy-shift effect. Finally, the expected welfare
gain relative to expected welfare without tax contracts is depicted in the lower right
part of figure 6. As our analytical results predict, the relative welfare gains increase
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Figure 6: Expected welfare differences between regimes with and without tax contracts
when pe is low
with the degree of political polarization. In this particular specification, there are
substantial welfare gains of up to 70% if polarization is large when the tax contracts
are introduced. The intuition is that the policy-shift towards the middle party will keep
policies moderate. By contrast, the absence of tax contracts would make the political
orientation of the small coalition deviate widely from the average income when E does
not enter.
8.2 pe very high
We now consider the case pe = 75%.
In this case, equilibrium 3 occurs, implying that policies are only moderate in small
coalitions but strongly tend to the left or right in grand coalitions. As indicated in
figure 7, these policy shifts towards L and R, rather than towards the middle, yield
increasing welfare losses with higher degrees of political polarization when tax contracts
are introduced.
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Figure 7: Expected welfare with and without tax contracts when pe is high
8.3 pe medium-sized
Finally we consider an intermediate value of pe = 1/3.
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Figure 8: Expected welfare with and without tax contracts when pe is medium-sized
For low degrees of polarization, the parties play equilibrium 2. As stated in corollary
2, the critical value pˆe,k will fall below pe = 1/3, if polarization increases. In the
example, this occurs first for pˆe,L. If pˆe,L < pe < pˆe,R, which occurs for degrees of
polarization above 2, equilibrium 3 occurs if party L chooses its tax contract first.
Otherwise equilibrium 2 obtains. With higher levels of polarization, both pˆe,L and pˆe,R
are smaller than pe = 1/3 and equilibrium 3 will be played in all cases. The jumps in
expected welfare under tax contracts, as illustrated in figure 8, reflect the switch from
one equilibrium to another.
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Figure 9: Expected welfare differences between regimes with and without tax contracts
when pe is medium-sized
Figure 9 displays the absolute and relative welfare gains obtained by allowing parties to
sign tax contracts. At low levels of polarization, the welfare increase with tax contracts
is again caused by a moderation of policies due to the policy shift towards the middle in
equilibrium 2. At a polarization level of about 2, there is a slight drop in the expected
welfare gains because equilibrium 3 occurs when L is the first to sign its tax contract.
Finally, for polarization levels greater than 5, only equilibrium 3 is played. Though this
causes another drop in expected welfare gains, the expected welfare difference between
the regime with and without tax contracts is increasing, as indicated by the upper left
graph in figure 9. The reason is that in equilibrium 3, there is a shift towards the middle
in small coalitions and this has a positive impact on welfare. The magnitude rises for
increasing levels of political polarization, as the weight of event ¬E, (1 − pe) = 0.667,
is higher than that of event E. The increase in expected welfare resulting from small
coalitions formed under tax contracts outweighs the decreases from the policy shifts
towards the left or right in grand coalitions under tax contracts.37
37However, for even larger degrees of political polarization than depicted above, the expected welfare
difference will decline and eventually turn negative.
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9 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a new type of party competition model to examine
the role of tax contracts for government formation in a parliamentary democracy. The
model involves three conventional parties and a fourth extremist party. If the extremist
party enters parliament, it will force the two large conventional parties to form a grand
coalition.
We show that allowing parties to sign tax contracts has two effects: a policy-shift effect
and a perks effect. The first captures the incentive for a party to influence the policy
of the coalition government in favor of its own political preferences by committing to a
range of tax rates. The latter effect mainly captures two opposing incentives for a party.
On the one hand, it would like to commit to higher tax rates to increase its perks, which
from the party’s perspective have insufficient weight in coalition bargaining. On the
other hand, the coalition partner’s perks act as a negative externality to the provision
of public goods and hence as an incentive to lower taxes.
We perform a welfare analysis illustrated by some examples. The main insights from
this exercise are: From a utilitarian welfare perspective, we find that tax contracts
may yield substantial welfare gains in a highly polarized society where the political
positions of the right and left party differ widely but the probability of the extremist
party entering parliament is not high. In this case, tax contracts are a means of
generating moderate political outcomes. However, there may be welfare losses if the
probability of the extremist party obtaining seats in parliament is very high, because
then the policy shift in grand coalitions is to the left or to the right, rather than towards
the middle.
In societies exhibiting a low degree of political polarization, the perks effect may play
an important role. Our numerical examples suggest that the relative welfare gains from
the perks effect are quite moderate, whereas substantial welfare changes are effected
by the policy shifts.
Our model can be extended in several directions. To keep our focus on the effects
of tax contracts on government formation, we have assumed that the electorate will
vote sincerly. It would be interesting, but not trivial, to extend our model to strategic
voting. One might also consider the possibility of tax contracts being conditional on
whether E or ¬E occurs. What would happen in this case is explored in this article’s
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working paper version38. There we show that such conditional contracts may further
improve welfare if political polarization is relatively small.
38For details see Gersbach and Schneider (2008).
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Appendix
A Conditions and Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2(ii)
A coalition of parties k and j optimally allocates a given budget tFY between public-
good provision and perks according to (12). Inserting this relation between public-good
provision and perks into the budget constraint and using sj = S − sk,39 we obtain
tFY = (1 + λ)
(
g +
(
θ
AS
)2
(s3k + (S − sk)3)g2
)
. (31)
The right-hand side is increasing in g. The term s3k + (S − sk)3 is strictly convex in
sk and reaches its unique minimum within [0, S] at sk = 0.5S. As the budget tFY
is given, g reaches its maximum at sk = 0.5S. This can be directly inferred from
(31) or via the implicit function theorem. Hence, we obtain that public-good provision
by coalition governments with a more asymmetric distribution of seats provides fewer
public goods. Accordingly, we have gRL(tF ) > gkM(tF ), k ∈ {R,L}. As the optimal
solution of a single-party government is reflected in the case sk = S (i.e., the most
unequal distribution of seats), we obtain gkM(tF ) > g
∗
k(tF ). ✷
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
There are two reasons why potential coalition partners can find a policy vector that
yields more utility to both than a caretaker government. Suppose tct is fixed.
1) A coalition with budget tctY would enjoy a higher level of public-good provision
than under a caretaker government. As the caretaker government acts as a single-
party government of bureaucrats, this follows from lemma 2(ii).
2) Both coalition partners would enjoy a positive amount of perks, whereas in a
caretaker government they would receive no perks.
Hence there exists a non-empty set of tax rates that would leave both coalition partners
better off than under a caretaker government. ✷
39Note that sj = S − sk implies σ2j = (S − sk)2/S2.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1 and Definition of Outside Option
Values V¯
We start with the situation where E does not enter parliament and solve the government
formation subgame by backward induction. In this section, we denote the party selected
to be the first formateur by F and the second formateur by j. The last formateur will
be party M.
1. Consider the last subgame of the government formation process where the small-
est party M becomes the formateur. It can offer a coalition to either F , the party
that has been the first formateur, or j, the second formateur. For each coalition
partner k ∈ {F, j}, M derives
Vˆ kM = max
t
VM(t, kM) s.t. Vk(t, kM) ≥ max{Vk(takM , kM), Vk(ct)},
and chooses F as a coalition partner if and only if Vˆ FM ≥ Vˆ jM . Note that we assume
that F will be chosen as a coalition partner if Vˆ FM = Vˆ
j
M . We will return to this
point later. The last formateur M is able to obtain a value of VˆM = maxk∈{F,j} V
k
M .
We denote the values the parties F and j will realize in this subgame by VˆF and
Vˆj , respectively.
2. The second formateur attracts a potential coalition partner by offering at least the
value it can obtain in the continuation of the game when the vote of confidence
fails. Again, let k stand for the potential coalition partner, in this case k ∈
{M,F}. When forming a coalition with party k, party j can achieve a value
V¯ kj = max
t
Vj(t, kj) s.t. Vk(t, kj) ≥ max{Vk(takj, kj), Vˆk}.
And party j will prefer a small coalition with M if and only if V¯ Mj ≥ V¯ Fj . Hence,
V¯j = maxk∈{F,M} V¯
k
j . Again denote the respective values of parties F and M by
V¯F and V¯M .
3. The first formateur will choose M as its coalition partner and hence will solve
max
t
VF (t, FM) s.t. VM(t, FM) ≥ max{VM(taFM , FM), V¯M}.
This equation corresponds to the maximation problem of the first formateur as
given in Proposition 1.
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Two points deserve further explanation: First, the first formateur always chooses M
as its coalition partner and, second, when the value of a caretaker government is suf-
ficiently low for M, the outside option value V¯M in the first formateur’s maximization
problem is either VM(t
a
FM , FM) or VM(t¯Fj, F j) where t¯Fj indicates the tax rate chosen
by the second formateur when it decides to form a grand coalition.
First Point
Concerning the first point, we recall that, given a particular coalition (i.e., grand or
small coalition), policies can be mapped into the tax-dimension and are single peaked.40
Party M’s bliss point in t is between those of the parties R and L. This means that
for a tax rate taLM , which lies between the ideal points of M and L, there is a tax
rate taRLM closer to the bliss point of R such that M is as well off as with t
a
LM , i.e.
VM(t
aR
LM , RM) = VM(t
a
LM , LM).
41 In this way, any policy proposed by the second
formateur j to its coalition partner must be closer to j’s ideal point than the policy,
say tˆ, that will materialize when M becomes the formateur. The second formateur j
can move this policy towards its own ideal point as follows. If tˆ = tˆFM , i.e. F and
M will form a coalition at the last stage, j offers a coalition to M with tˆjFM , where
VM(tˆ
j
FM , jM) = VM(tˆFM , FM). If tˆ = tˆjM , i.e. j and M will form a coalition at the
last stage, j offers a coalition to F , which would accept a policy closer to j’s ideal than
tˆ as F additionally gets perks when in government.
We observe that this outcome makes j unattractive as a coalition partner for the first
formateur F . The reason is that if j will form a small coalition with M with policy
t¯jM , the first formateur F could offer M a coalition with t¯
F
jM thereby tilting the policy
t¯jM towards its own ideal point. A shift of the policy towards F’s ideal point would not
be possible when offering a grand coalition to j.42 If a grand coalition with t¯Fj occurs
in the continuation of the game when j becomes the formateur, F will be able to offer
to M a policy closer to its ideal than t¯Fj and provide M exactly its continuation value
V¯M . Therefore the first formateur F will always choose M as a coalition partner at the
first stage of the government formation process.
40A proof of this claim can be found in section 6.
41Recall that relative share of the perks for M is the same in both coalitions, LM and RM.
42There are no additional perks (since j will be in a small coalition government in the continuation
of the game) that F could offer in return for a policy shift in its favor.
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Second Point
Now consider the situation where M’s valuation of a caretaker government is low, i.e.
VM(t
a
kM , kM) > VM(ct), k ∈ {F, j}. When M becomes the last formateur either taFM
or tajM will be chosen. In the first case, the second formateur will offer a coalition to
M with tajFM , where VM(t
aj
FM , jM) = VM(t
a
FM , FM). In the second case, j offers to F a
tax rate t¯Fj closer to j’s ideal point than t
a
jM . Consequently, F cannot do better than
offering to M either taFM (when j will offer t
aj
FM) or t¯
F
Fj the reflection of t¯Fj such that
VM(t¯
F
Fj , FM) = VM(t¯Fj, F j) (when j will offer t¯Fj). Hence, the outside option values
V¯M in the maximization problems given in proposition 1 are either VM(t¯
F
FM , FM) or
VM(t
a
FM , FM).
Equilibrium selection
The equilibrium in the government formation process is unique except for the special
cases where a formateur is indifferent between two potential coalition partners. The
particular case where party M is indifferent between forming a small coalition with j
or F, i.e. VM(t
a
FM , FM) = VM(t
a
jM , jM), is of particular interest as it will be employed
in the welfare comparison of government formation with and without tax contracts.43
In case party M is indifferent between forming a small coalition with j or F at the last
stage of the government formation process, we break this indifference by assuming that
M as the last formateur will offer a coalition to F. This assumption may be justified at
a deeper level by the following forward induction argument.
Recall from the beginning of this paragraph that the equilibrium outcome will be t¯FFj
when M forms a coalition with j at the last stage, while it will be taFM when it decides
for F. Further, our previous discussion implies that VM(t¯
F
Fj, FM) < VM(t
a
FM , FM).
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Since t¯FFj will be proposed only in the equilibrium where M chooses j as a coalition
partner in the last subgame of the government formation process, declining the offer
t¯FFj of the first formateur F in the vote of confidence signals that M intends to offer a
coalition to F when becoming the formateur in the last subgame as otherwise this would
not be optimal. Consequently, F would decline a potential offer of t¯Fj by the second
43The two equilibria that may occur can be summarized as follows. Equilibrium 1: M offers taFM
to F, j offers tajFM to M, F offers t
a
FM to M. Equilibrium 2: M offers t
a
jM to j, j offers t¯Fj to F , F
offers t¯FFj to M.
44The reason can be summarized as follows. If the second formateur j offers a grand coalition to F , M
is worse off than in a small coalition: VM (t¯Fj , F j) < VM (t
a
FM , FM) = VM (t
a
jM , jM). Since at the first
stage, F will offer to M a policy t¯FFj such that VM (t¯
F
Fj , FM) = VM (t¯Fj , F j) if it expects that j will form
a grand coalition in the continuation of the game, we directly obtain VM (t¯
F
Fj , FM) < VM (t
a
FM , FM).
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formateur j as F expects to be offered a small coalition with M in the continuation
of the game which would involve VF (t
a
FM , FM) > VM(t¯Fj, F j). Based on this forward
induction argument we will focus on the equilibrium outcome (taFM , FM) in the case
where VM(t
a
FM , FM) = VM(t
a
jM , jM).
E enters parliament
Finally, we consider the situation where E enters parliament. Then only a grand
coalition is possible. The second formateur solves
V¯j = max
t
Vj(t, RL) s.t. VF (t, RL) ≥ max{VF (taRL, RL), VF (ct)},
which directly leads to the constraint of the maximization problem of the first formateur
as given in proposition 1.
A.4 Formal Definition of Conditions C2 and C3
t∗M,sc := argmax
t
VM
s.t. tY ≥ (1 + λ)(g(t) + (sMbM (t) + skbk(t)),
where k ∈ {R,L}.
t∗M,(sc) :=

tbcFM , if either ∀t ∈ τR ∩ τL : t > t∗M,sc and t∗M < t∗M,sc
or ∀t ∈ τR ∩ τL : t < t∗M,sc and t∗M > t∗M,sc
t∗M,sc , else.
(32)
where
tbcFM = arg max
t∈τM∩τF
σMVM(t, FM) + σFVF (t, FM),
and F is the formateur with τM ∩ τF 6= ∅.
For a given set τk = [t
∗
k, t
−
k ] with t
−
k ∈ [t∗k, t∗M,sc):45
tjM := argmax
t
Vj(t, jM)
s.t.VM(t, jM) > VM(t
−
k , kM),
VM(t, jM) > VM(ct).
45We are aware that due to the strict inequality constraint and the continuity of VM (·, co) the
maximization problem that defines tjM has no solution. In this paper we understand all inequality
constraints in the way that there is an arbitrarily small “grid size” ε.
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Further, we have
t′j := argmax
t∈τk
Vj(t, RL)
s.t. Vk(t, RL) > Vk(ct).
t+kj := arg max
t∈[t∗j ,t
∗
M,sc
)
Vk(t, RL)
s.t. Vj(t, RL) > Vj(ct).
t−kj := arg max
t∈[t∗
k
,t∗
M,sc
)
Vk(t, RL)
s.t.
1− pe
pe
<
Vj(t, RL)− Vj(ct)
Vj(tjM , jM)− Vj(t∗M,(sc), jM)
.
Note that the last constraint uses equation (33) expressing that j will find a grand
coalition with t and a small coalition with tM,(sc) better than a caretaker government
in event E and a small coalition with tjM in event ¬E. Conditions C2 and C3 can be
formalized as follows:
Condition C2: For a given t−kj ∈ [t∗k, t∗M,sc],
1− pe
pe
<
Vj(t
−
kj , RL)− Vj(ct)
Vj(tjM , jM)− Vj(t∗M,(sc), jM)
. (33)
Condition C3:
1− pe
pe
>
Vk(t
−
kj, RL)− Vk(t′L, RL)
1
2
(Vk(t∗M,sc, kM)− Vk(t∗M,sc, jM)) + Vk(t∗M,sc, jM)− Vk(t∗M,(sc), jM)
. (34)
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose that event ¬E comes about and party k ∈ {L,R} has been chosen as the first
formateur in the government-formation stage of the legislative game. Due to τR∩τL 6= ∅
and assumption 1, a grand coalition and a small coalition will be possible.46 Without
loss of generality, assume that k can choose between suggesting a grand coalition or
a small coalition and there is one common tax-rate t that can be implemented either
with the small party M or the other large party j. Party k will choose M as a coalition
partner for two reasons:
46Note that without assumption 1, it may be that τR ∩ τM = ∅ and τL ∩ τM = ∅, and hence a small
coalition would not be possible.
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1) Party k will occupy more seats in government than in a grand coalition.
2) Bargaining over expenditures (given revenues tY)
σkVk + σjVj
over (g, bj, bk, d = 0) subject to the budget constraint
tFY = (1 + λ)(g + sjbj + skbk)
involves higher weight for k’s preferences.
As for a given tax rate a small coalition will yield higher utility for party k than a grand
coalition, the only reason for k to suggest a grand coalition would be if the tax rate it can
implement in a grand coalition, tˆRL, provides a sufficiently greater utility level than the
tax rate (tˆkM) it can implement in a small coalition, i.e. Vk(tˆRL, gc) > Vk(tˆkM , sc). This,
however, implies that Vj(tˆRL, gc) < Vj(tjM , sc). Consequently, j would not support the
vote of confidence and offer a small coalition to M when it is the formateur itself. ✷
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is established by backward induction.
Stage 1.3
Consider party M at the third stage. As τR and τL are given, M cannot influence
the policy in a grand coalition. Hence party M contracts to the set of tax rates
that yield the highest utility if ¬E. M may face two situations: Either τR∩τL = ∅
or τR ∩ τL 6= ∅.
If τR∩τL 6= ∅, party M knows that any possible set τM will intersect with at least
one of the large parties’ tax-sets, so a small coalition will be feasible. According
to lemma 4, a small coalition will result in the case of ¬E and M can contract
to its preferred tax rate t∗M,sc. Note that, due to assumption 1, it may be the
case that in a coalition with party k, if {t∗M , t∗M,sc} ∈ τk, the coalition outcome
will not be t∗M,sc but a different tax rate t
bc
FM .
47 In these situations, M will be
indifferent between the sets [t∗M , t
∗
M,sc] and [t
∗
M , t
bc
FM ] and due to assumption 2 will
47tbcFM is defined in appendix A.4.
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sign τM = [t
∗
M , t
bc
FM ]. For τR ∩ τL 6= ∅, we can generally write
(t∗M,sc > t
∗
M ∧ ∀t ∈ τR ∩ τL : t > t∗M,sc) ∨ (t∗M,sc < t∗M ∧ ∀t ∈ τR ∩ τL : t < t∗M,sc)
→ τM = [t∗M , tbcFM ]
In all other cases, we have τM = [t
∗
M , t
∗
M,sc].
If τR ∩ τL = ∅ , M solves
max
t,j∈{L,R}
VM(t,Mj)
s.t. t ∈ τj .
Denote the solution by tMj , where j indicates the preferred coalition partner. If
VM(tMj ,Mj) > VM(ct), then τM = [t
∗
M , tMj], otherwise, τM = {t∗M}.
Note that we have neglected the case [t∗M , tMk] ⊂ τk for k ∈ {L,R}, as it will
never be chosen in equilibrium.
Stage 1.2
Suppose without loss of generality that k = R.48 There are three possible cases
for the upper bound of R’s tax contract, t¯R: t¯R > t
∗
M,sc , t¯R = t
∗
M,sc, or t¯R < t
∗
M,sc.
Anticipating the reaction of M, party L takes the following choices:
1) τR = [t
∗
R, t
∗
M,sc]
In this case, the candidates for best tax sets of L are τˆL = [t
∗
L, t
′
L] and
τ¯L = {t∗L}, where
t′L := argmax
t∈τR
VL(t, RL)
s.t. VR(t, RL) ≥ VR(ct).
With τˆL, L may be part of a small coalition with t
∗
M,sc if ¬E and will join
a grand coalition with t′L if E. If VL(t
∗
M,sc, RL) < VL(ct), L would let the
48Note that, due to the implementation restriction, it may make a difference whether R or L is the
first to choose its tax contract. With respect to the generality of the proof, this is only a problem if
the direction of the implementation restriction is known, i.e. whether t∗k is greater or smaller than
t∗k,co. Hence, although we know that t
∗
k,co < t
∗
k, for this proof we neglect this knowledge in order
to establish generality in the sense that we do not know whether the first mover R suffers from the
implementation restriction. (The transfer to the general case is that we do not know which party will
be the first mover at the contract-choice stage and hence we do not know whether the implementation
restriction applies to this party.)
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vote of confidence fail and hence force a caretaker government into power.
Choosing τ¯L yields a small coalition of R and M with t
∗
M,(sc) in event ¬E
and a care-taker government in event E. Hence τ¯L is dominated by τˆL.
2) τR = [t
∗
R, t
+
R], where t
+
R > t
∗
M,sc.
In order to keep the exposition as simple as possible, assume that49
t+R := arg max
t∈[t∗
L
,t∗
M,sc
]
VR(t, RL)
s.t. VL(t, RL) ≥ VL(ct).
Candidates for best tax contracts are τˆL = [t
∗
L, t
∗
M,sc], τ
′
L = [t
∗
L, t
+
R] and τ¯L =
{t∗L}.
The coalition outcomes for the different choices are as follows:
set ¬E E
τˆL VL(t
∗
M,sc, LM) VL(t
+
R, RL)
or VL(t
∗
M,sc, RM)
τ ′L VL(t
∗
M,(sc), RM) VL(t
+
R, RL)
τ¯L VL(t
∗
M,(sc), RM) VL(ct)
The table reveals that L will choose τˆL since it dominates the other choices.
3) τR = [t
∗
R, t
−
R], where t
−
R < t
∗
M,sc.
In this case there are three candidates for best responses of L: τ ′L = [t
∗
L, t
′
L], τ
′′
L =
[t∗L, tLM ] and τ¯L = {t∗L}, where tLM is defined by
tLM := argmax
t
VL(t, LM)
s.t. VM(t, LM) > VM(t
−
R, RM),
VM(t, LM) > VM(ct).
The outcomes with the different sets are:
set ¬E E
τ ′L VL(t
∗
M,(sc), LM) VL(t
′
L, RL), if VL(ct) ≤ VL(t′L, RL)
VL(ct), else
τ ′′L VL(tLM , LM) VL(ct)
τ¯L VL(t
−
R, RM) VL(ct)
or VL(ct)
49This is the only case that occurs in equilibrium. For clarity of exposition, we here omit the
out-of-equilibrium responses by L to other choices made by party R.
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It is clear that VL(tLM , LM) > VL(t
−
R, RM) and due to lemma 3, VL(tLM , LM) >
VL(ct). Hence τ¯L is strictly dominated by τ
′′
L. Consequently, L will compare
the sets τ ′L and τ
′′
L and decide for τ
′
L if
1− pe
pe
<
VL(t
′
L, RL)− VL(ct)
VL(tLM , LM)− VL(t∗M,(sc), LM)
. (35)
Stage 1.1
At the first stage, R decides on τR, anticipating the reactions of L and M. The
candidates for optimal tax sets are τˆR = [t
∗
R, t
∗
M,sc], τ
′
R = [t
∗
R, tRL] and τ¯R = [t
∗
R, t˜R],
where
tRL :=
{
t+RL , if {t−RL ∈ [t∗R, t∗M,sc] : (35)} = ∅,
t−RL , if {t−RL ∈ [t∗R, t∗M,sc] : (35)} 6= ∅,
and
t+RL := arg max
t>t∗
M,sc
VR(t, RL)
s.t. forVL(t, RL) ≥ VL(ct).
t−RL := arg max
t<t∗
M,sc
VR(t, RL)
s.t. for t = t′L, (35).
t˜R := arg max
t<t∗
M,sc
VR(tLM , LM)
s.t. t = t−RL, ¬(35).
Consider the case where tRL > t
∗
M,sc, i.e. tRL = t
+
RL. From the definition of t
+
RL,
this implies
∀t ∈ [t∗R, t∗M,sc], VL(t, RL) < VL(ct). (36)
Using (36), we obtain the outcomes associated with the three tax sets:
set ¬E E
τˆR VR(t
∗
M,sc, RM) VR(ct)
or VR(t
∗
M,sc, LM)
τ ′R VR(t
∗
M,sc, RM) VR(t
+
RL, RL)
or VR(t
∗
M,sc, LM)
τ¯R VR(tLM , LM) VR(ct)
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As VR(t
∗
M,sc, LM) > VR(tLM , LM), τ¯R is strictly dominated by τˆR. Further, R
will prefer τ ′R to τˆR if
VR(t
+
RL, RL) > VR(ct)
This inequality must hold due to lemma 3. Hence, if tRL > t
∗
M,sc, R will choose
τ ′R.
If tRL < t
∗
M,sc, i.e. tRL = t
−
RL. Then, the three tax sets yield
set ¬E E
τˆR VR(t
∗
M,sc, RM) VR(t
′
L, RL)
or VR(t
∗
M,sc, LM)
τ ′R VR(t
∗
M,(sc), LM) VR(t
−
RL, RL)
τ¯R VR(tLM , LM) VR(ct)
As VR(t
′
L, RL) ≥ VR(ct), τˆR dominates τ¯R. A comparison of τˆR with τ ′R leads to
R adopting τˆR over τ
′
R if
1− pe
pe
>
VR(t
−
RL, RL)− VR(t′L, RL)
1
2
(VR(t
∗
M,sc, RM)− VR(t∗M,sc, LM)) + VR(t∗M,sc, LM)− VR(t∗M,(sc), LM)
.
(37)
To sum up, we obtain the following types of equilibria:
1.
τuR = [t
∗
R, t
+
RL],
τuL = [t
∗
L, t
∗
M,sc],
τuM = [t
∗
M , t
∗
M,sc].
if (36).
2.
τuR = [t
∗
R, t
∗
M,sc],
τuL = [t
∗
L, t
′
L],
τuM = [t
∗
M , t
∗
M,sc].
if ¬(36) and (37) or ¬(36) and ¬(35).
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3.
τuR = [t
∗
R, t
−
RL],
τuL = [t
∗
L, t
−
RL],
τuM = [t
∗
M , t
∗
M,(sc)].
if ¬(36), (35) and ¬(37).
Note that the equilibrium conditions correspond to the formal conditions given in
appendix A.4. ✷
A.7 Proof of Lemma 5
Here we show that for all g > 0, P (g, σk) < 1 if σk < 0.5, P (g, 0.5) = 1 and P (g, σk) > 1
if σk > 0.5.
Recall that
P (g, σk) =
0.5A2 + skσkθ
2g
0.5A2 + sjσ2j θ
2g + skσ2kθ
2g
.
Suppose σk < 0.5. Then
sk <
S
2
. (38)
Using sj = S − sk, we obtain
skσk < sjσj . (39)
Then the following inequality holds
0.5A2 + skσkθ
2g < 0.5A2 + sjσ
2
j θ
2g + skσ
2
kθ
2g
and consequently P (g, σk) < 1. The results for σk = 0.5 and σk > 0.5 can be derived
in the same way. ✷
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider case (i), where pe is small enough for equilibrium 2 to be realized in the tax
contracts regime.
Using (29), we can define the welfare difference as follows:
∆W unoc2 = peUy¯(t
∗
M,sc, gc) + (1− pe)Uy¯(t∗M,sc, sc)
−
[
peUy¯(t
nc
RL, gc) +
(1− pe)
2
(Uy¯(t
nc
RM , sc) + Uy¯(t
nc
LM , sc))
]
.
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An increase in polarization affects the welfare difference according to
∂∆W unoc2
∂∆l
=
d∆W unoc2
dlR
= −pe
(
∂Uy¯(t
nc
RL, gc)
∂lR
+
∂Uy¯(t
nc
RL, gc)
∂lL
dlL
dlR
)
−(1− pe)
2
(
∂Uy¯(t
nc
RM , sc)
∂lR
+
Uy¯(t
nc
LM , sc)
∂lL
dlL
dlR
)
.
As due to assumption 5 dlL
dlR
must be smaller than 0, the welfare difference between a
tax contracts regime and one without tax contracts will increase if
∂Uy¯(t
nc
RL, gc)
∂lR
+
∂Uy¯(t
nc
RL, gc)
∂lL
dlL
dlR
< 0 ,
∂Uy¯(t
nc
RM , sc)
∂lR
< 0 ,
Uy¯(t
nc
LM , sc)
∂lL
> 0 .
With
∂Uy¯(t
nc
RM , sc)
∂lR
=
[
A
gncRM
− ∂t(g
nc
RM )
∂gncRM
]
∂gncRM
∂lR
,
the condition
∂Uy¯(t
nc
RM , sc)
∂lR
< 0
implies
A >
∂t(gncRM )
∂gncRM
gncRM . (40)
The right-hand side is a strictly increasing quadratic function in gncRM . As g
nc
RM is
decreasing with lR, condition (40) will be satisfied for sufficiently large values of lR.
Using the same steps as above, the condition
∂Uy¯(t
nc
LM , sc)
∂lL
> 0
can be written as
A <
∂t(gncLM )
∂gncLM
gncLM . (41)
Since gncLM is decreasing with lL, it is guaranteed that the condition will be satisfied for
small enough lL.
Finally, we determine how the policy under a grand coalition changes with increasing
political polarization. We can write
dUy¯(t
nc
RL, gc)
dlR
=
[
A
gncRL
− ∂t(g
nc
RL)
∂gncRL
]
∂gncRL
∂lR
(
1 +
dlL
dlR
)
.
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In our setting, we must have
∣∣∣ dlLdlR ∣∣∣ < 1, which implies that lRL increases with ∆l and
that gncRL consequently decreases. For
dUy¯(t
nc
RL, gc)
dlR
< 0
to hold, we require
A >
∂t(gncRL)
∂gncRL
gncRL. (42)
As gncRL decreases in ∆l, the condition (42) will hold for a sufficiently large degree of
political polarization. Hence, tax contracts are socially preferable for sufficiently large
political polarization ∆l.
The comparison is similar but more involved in case (ii), where pe is large enough for
equilibrium 3 to occur in the regime with tax contracts. The argument can be most
easily demonstrated for high values of pe.
Suppose that pe is arbitrarily close to 1 and thus equilibrium 3 occurs. As the proba-
bility of ¬E is negligible, we can concentrate on what happens for event E. With high
polarization, the policy outcome of a grand coalition under tax contracts is much more
extreme than without tax contracts. Hence for sufficiently high pe and sufficiently
high polarization tax contracts are less socially desirable than a regime without tax
contracts.50
A.9 Proof of Proposition 7
The condition pe < mink∈{R,L} pˆe,k guarantees that equilibrium 2 will occur under a
regime with tax contracts, thus producing a policy characterized by t∗M,sc in both a
small and a grand coalition. ∆l being close enough to ∆
min
l implies that t
∗
R,sc ≈ t∗M,sc
and consequently that t∗M,sc ≈ tncRM ≈ tncLM . Hence the policies with and without tax
contracts coincide in event ¬E. Policy differences occur for event E. In E, the grand
coalition implements t∗M,sc with tax contracts, whereas in the absence of tax contracts
will produce the bargaining outcome tncRL.
Since lM ≤ 1, the average voter’s preferred tax rate is lower than that of the middle
party’s platform voter: ty¯ < tyM . From equation (28) we deduce that tyM < t
∗
M,sc.
Whether government-formation with tax contracts will yield a higher level of welfare
50A formal analysis of the argument is available on request.
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than without tax contracts depends on whether t∗M,sc < t
nc
RL.
51
51Note that although it can be shown that g∗M,sc < g
nc
RL for ∆l ≈ ∆minl , this does not imply
t∗M,sc < t
nc
RL. The reason is that the amount of perks associated with the provision of one unit of the
public good by a grand coalition is lower than it would be with a small coalition, as stated in lemma
2(ii).
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B List of Tax Rates
Symbol Meaning
t∗k ideal tax policy of party k if it is the sole party in power
tnckj tax rate agreed upon by party k and party j when bargaining without
tax contracts
tk lower bound of contracted tax-set of party k
tk upper bound of contracted tax-set of party k
tct tax policy in the caretaker government
t∗M,sc most preferred tax-rate of the center party M, if it is part of a
small coalition
t∗M,(sc) bargaining outcome in a small coalition formed with tax contracts
t∗k,gc most preferred tax-rate of party k if it is part of a grand coalition
tkj most preferred tax-rate of (first-mover) party k in a grand coalition
with j, given that j will include this tax-rate in its contracted set at
the second stage
t−kj indicates that tkj is in the interval [t
∗
k, t
∗
M,sc). That is, tkj is closer
to k’s ideal policy t∗k than t
∗
M,sc
t+kj indicates that tkj is in the interval [t
∗
j , t
∗
M,sc). That is, tkj is farther
from k’s ideal policy t∗k than t
∗
M,sc
takj comprehensive bargaining solution of parties k and j without
tax contracts
tbckj comprehensive bargaining solution of parties k and j constrained by
the set τk ∩ τj
t′j most preferred tax-rate of (second-mover) party j within
(first-mover) party k’s tax set τk, such that party k’s utility is weakly
higher than in a caretaker government
tMj center party’s most preferred tax rate within the tax-set τj of its
preferred coalition partner j
tjM most preferable tax rate of (second-mover) party j in a small coalition,
such that M is willing to have a coalition with j rather than with
(first-mover) k
t˜k boundary of k’s tax-set implying the most preferable tjM from k’s
viewpoint provided that τj ∩ τk = ∅
tekj tkj conditioned on the event that party E enters parliament
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